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l)MOTIVATION, COORDINATION AND COGNITION IN COOPERATIVES
A cooperative is a firm collectively owned by many independent input suppliers or buyers.
This dissertation examines the nature of a cooperative and its efficiency compared with
other governance structures from the perspectives of motivation, coordination and cogni -
tion. We find that the lack of public listing in cooperatives may result in the cooperative being
the unique efficient governance structure under either one of two conditions: 1) addi tio -
nal sources of information like accounting information and subjective performance evalua -
tions are available; 2) the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing
in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal
product. A cooperative as a coordination device is always efficient due to its prevention of
double mark-up. The influence of governance structures (market, cooperative, forward
integration, and backward integration) on the information partitions of boundedly rational
agents is also investigated. We show that each governance structure can be efficient,
depending on the probabilities of the various states and the size of the potential benefit
and loss. A cooperative enterprise’s conservativeness to change is explained.
In sum, the main objective of the dissertation is to deepen the current understanding
of the cooperative as one governance structure out of many. It is compared with other
governance structures from various perspectives. In doing so, I hope to ease the doubt of
some researchers regarding the efficiency of the cooperative and to identify the conditions
under which cooperatives are efficient. 
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Chapter 1 
On the Nature of Cooperatives: 
A System of Attributes Perspective 
  
There is at present no (satisfactory) way of characterizing organizations in 
terms of continuous variation over a spectrum. 
Ward (1967, p38) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The nature of a cooperative has been debated frequently. An important 
contribution is Emelianoff (1948), triggering the debate in the 1950s and 
1960s. Three views are distinguished in the debate. The extension of the 
farm view maintains that the cooperative is just an association of firms, not 
a new firm per se; it has no entrepreneurial unit (Phillips 1953; Trifon 1961). 
The vertical integration view advocates that member firms are integrated 
with the downstream production stage. It entails that several stages in the 
production process are brought under one entrepreneurial control (Phillips 
1953, p79). The firm view suggests that a cooperative is itself a business 
enterprise and an economic entity; a new decision-making body is created 
by the formation of a cooperative (Helmberger & Hoos 1962, p290; 
Robotka 1947, p103). A cooperative is viewed as a special type of firm 
capable of making entrepreneurial decisions just as any private corporation 
(Savage 1954). 
 
This article highlights marketing cooperatives. A marketing cooperative is 
collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers. 
Members not only hold formal authority and take responsibilities over the 
cooperative, but also share its costs and revenues. Part of their assets and 
activities are combined and coordinated by the cooperative. Meanwhile, 
members are independent in the sense they do not necessarily collaborate 
with each other on other aspects of their individual farms. They advance the 
interests of their own farm enterprises. Members of a cooperative have 
therefore two roles. On the one hand, they are the patrons of the cooperative 
who provide inputs. They grow produce and deliver it to the downstream 
stage where the produce is processed or marketed. On the other hand, they 
collectively possess residual rights over the cooperative and make vital 
decisions upon important issues regarding it.  
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The next section briefly reviews the old debate. Section 1.3 introduces the 
concept of a system of attributes in order to formulate a unified account of 
the various positions. Section 1.4 highlights a number of subsequent 
contributions. Section 1.5 concludes with directions for further research. 
 
1.2 The old debate 
Two positions have been distinguished in the literature on the nature of a 
cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farms or as a firm (Cook 
1994; Oustapassidis, Vlachvei & Karantininis 1998). Among the most cited 
articles from the 1940s to 1960s, Phillips (1953) and Trifon (1961) 
emphasize the nature of a cooperative as extension of farms, while Robotka 
(1947), Savage (1954), and Helmberger & Hoos (1962) argue in favour of 
the firm position. On closer inspection of these articles and later research, 
we identify vertical integration as a third view regarding the nature of a 
cooperative (Phillips 1953; Robotka 1947; Trifon 1961). We address these 
contributions in chronological order. 
 
Referring to a cooperative both as ‘an extension of their entrepreneurial 
functioning’ (Robotka 1947, p113) and as ‘concerted integration’ (Robotka 
1947, p102), Robotka (1947) does not make explicit the distinction between 
the extension of the farm view and the vertical integration view. The non-
profit feature of the cooperative provides support for the former perspective, 
while the collective ownership of upstream farmers over downstream assets 
characterized in the article can be seen as an argument for the latter position. 
However, more important is his observation that ‘a new economic entity 
emerges when a cooperative association is formed, because participants 
must agree to submit to group decisions questions relating to the activity 
being coordinated’ (Robotka 1947, p113). This crucial last point leads us to 
classify this paper in support of the cooperative as a firm position. 
 
Phillips (1953) is also equivocal on the distinction among the three 
positions. On the one hand, he mentions both ‘concerted integration’ (p85) 
and the analogy of a cooperative as a plant of a multi-plant firm: ‘The 
participating firms are ordinarily vertically integrated in the sense that the 
output of the joint plant is the raw product input of the individual plants of 
the participating firms – or alternatively, the output of the individual plants 
of the participating firms is the raw product input of the joint plant (p79)’; 
‘Such participating firms are integrated in the sense that several stages in 
the production process are brought under one entrepreneurial control (p79).’ 
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On the other hand, he asserts that the cooperative is not a new firm (p75] 
based on the argument that it is not a firm unless it seeks profits for itself, 
which is an ex parte statement per se. In addition, the author argues that ‘the 
cooperative … has no entrepreneurial unit; its member units each have their 
entrepreneur’ and ‘the cooperative association consists of the sum of the 
multi-lateral agreements among the firms participating in the joint activity’ 
(p76), which fits the extension of farm position. 
 
Phillips’ focus on the upstream farm was soon challenged by Savage (1954), 
a comment on Phillips’ work, which considers a cooperative as a firm 
capable of making entrepreneurial decisions as any other private 
corporation. ‘Though farmers own their cooperatives and control them in 
the broad sense of the word, they do not make all or most of the 
entrepreneurial decisions’ (p531). ‘The delegation of decision rights is the 
common practice of cooperative. The individual farmers pool certain of 
their entrepreneurial functions and in doing so they authorized a collective 
body to perform these functions for them. In the process the farmers create 
an agency and defer to it some of their individual prerogatives’ (p532). 
Therefore the author concludes that the cooperative should be seen as a 
‘going concern performing entrepreneurial functions’ (p532) and is much 
more than a formalization of cooperation. In other words, a cooperative is 
more than an alliance or an association of firms. 
 
While acknowledging that cooperatives resemble to a certain extent the 
characteristics of vertical integration, i.e., the ‘subjugation to external 
economic control’ (Trifon 1961, p216) and the absence of a profit-seeking 
purpose, Trifon (1961) stresses also that the plurality of interests of the 
members distinguishes a cooperative from vertical integration, one with a 
single locus of profit maximization. He claims that the cooperative, as an 
aggregate of economic units, is ‘functioning only as a branch or part of the 
associated economic units’ (p215-216), which is close to the extension of 
the farm view. 
 
Helmberger & Hoos (1962) denies Phillips’ analogy between a cooperative 
and a vertically integrated firm on the grounds that ‘when agricultural 
producers jointly undertake the creation of a cooperative association, they 
seek goods and services provided at cost’ (p280), rather than a high return 
on the investments like investors in the usual type of business enterprise. 
Furthermore, they hold the cooperative, in spite of its different intended 
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objectives from an Investor Owned Firm (IOF), is a firm, a decision-
making entity, given that the ‘theory of the firm can be adapted to reflect 
the cooperative’s peculiar economic nature’ (p281). Table 1 summarizes 
these views regarding the nature of a cooperative. Some articles we quote 
have features of various views and are thus double listed. 
 
 
Extension of the farm 
view 
(Phillips 1953, 
Trifon 1961) 
Vertical integration 
view 
(Phillips 1953, 
Trifon 1961) 
Firm view 
(Robotka 1947, 
Savage 1954, 
Helmberger & Hoos 
1962) 
The nature 
of a 
cooperative 
An association of 
firms, 
not a new firm 
Several production 
stages brought under 
one entrepreneurial 
control 
A business enterprise, 
a new decision making 
body 
Focus of 
analysis The member firms 
The interaction 
between members and 
the cooperative firm 
The cooperative firm 
 
Table 1: Three views regarding the nature of a cooperative 
 
1.3 Cooperative as a system of attributes 
Milgrom & Roberts (1990) propose that an organization is composed of 
attributes and can therefore be perceived as a system. An attribute 
represents a certain aspect of an organization, like an organizational 
department, an activity undertaken, or a policy carried out by the 
organization. Examples of attributes are production technology, marketing, 
sourcing, logistics, communication, personnel, accounting, financing, 
authority and incentives. An attribute can take multiple values such as 
“large”, “medium”, and “small”, “weak” and “strong,” or “rigid” and 
“flexible”. Figure 1 provides an illustration of a system with three attributes. 
It represents, for instance, a dairy cooperative characterized by three 
attributes, x1 as the product portfolio (with attribute values like ‘bulk’ or 
‘specialty’ products), x2 as sourcing (‘make’ or ‘buy’), and x3 as financing 
(‘retained earnings’ or ‘certificates’). Hendrikse & Veerman (1997) 
distinguish eleven attributes regarding marketing cooperatives. 
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Figure 1: A system of three attributes 
 
The attributes have to be aligned in order to bring their interdependencies 
and interactions to value. The complementarities, or the positive 
externalities, among group of activities is thus at the center of the analysis, 
i.e. systemic effects are highlighted because the payoff associated with the 
level of one attribute depends on the level of all the other attributes. 
Exploiting these complementarities requires coordinated action between the 
separate attributes in order to obtain organizational coherence. 
 
We contrast the three positions regarding a cooperative in two ways. First, 
we believe that the core of each contention is the analytical emphasis, 
should it be on the upstream farms, on the downstream processor, or the 
interaction of the two? Second, the three positions can be distinguished in 
terms of the number of attributes involved in the upstream and downstream 
stages. Figure 2 illustrates the differences. The vertical integration view 
specifies only one attribute, i.e., the transaction between the members and 
the processor, because all attention is focused on the transaction between 
the two parties. The upstream and downstream parties are treated as two 
stages of production that are united through a hierarchy and under one 
management control. The interaction and vertical relationship between two 
stages of production are the focus of analysis.  
X1 
X3 
X2 
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Figure 2: Distinguishing the three positions by the number of attributes 
 
From the extension of the farm view, each upstream farm is an autonomous 
enterprise consisting of a system of various attributes, while the 
downstream processor is treated not as an enterprise, but as a stage of 
production subordinate to the member farms, like a plant of a multi-plant 
firm (Phillips 1953). With this conception of the cooperative, all of the 
attention is focused on (the entrepreneurs of) the member firms. The 
interdependencies between the various activities in the portfolio of a farm 
enterprise are thus highlighted. The attributes of the upstream farms and 
their impact on the cooperative are emphasized. 
 
The firm view highlights the downstream party, which is perceived as a 
business enterprise that forms a system of attributes by itself. Upstream 
members are also characterized by their own attributes. The synergy 
between the transaction and financial attributes between members and the 
downstream entity determines to a large extent the success of the 
cooperative as a whole. 
 
Table 2 summarizes these observations. From the extension of the farm 
view and the vertical integration view, the downstream stage consists of 
only one attribute, i.e., the processing of farm products. Their difference 
resides in the characterization of the upstream attributes. The extension of 
farm view emphasizes the upstream attributes and their impact on the 
downstream stage. From the perspective of the firm view, the core of the 
cooperative firm consists of the downstream party. It is characterized by 
Upstream 
Members 
Downstream 
Processor 
Vertical 
integration view  
Extension of the 
farm view 
Firm view 
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various attributes, where these attributes have to be aligned with various 
attributes of the members firms. 
 
 
Table 2: Characterizing the three views in terms of the number of attributes 
 
The three views regarding a cooperative are distinguished further by the 
upstream and downstream externalities (table 3). An externality exists when 
the actions of one party result in benefits or costs for another party. Here the 
upstream externality refers to the impact of upstream attribute choices on 
the choices of the downstream party. Examples of downstream problems 
caused by upstream externalities are the horizon problem and the portfolio 
problem (Cook 1995). The downstream externality captures the opposite. 
The source of a downstream externality lies in either the collective decision 
making feature or a pooling arrangement at the downstream party. 
Examples of the impact of downstream attributes on the choices made by 
the upstream members are the influence problem, the control problem, the 
free rider problem (Cook 2005), and the selection problem (Hendrikse & 
Bijman 2002). Both upstream and downstream externalities can be positive 
or negative.1  
 
Starting with the simplest case in terms of upstream and downstream 
externalities, the vertical integration view emphasizes solely the (attributes 
covering the) exchange between the upstream farms and the downstream 
                                                 
1 This list of externalities is not exhaustive. For example, an advantage of vertical 
integration compared to a setting with independent upstream and downstream 
firms is that the double-marginalization problem is eliminated (Spengler 1950). 
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Downstream externality 
Upstream externality 
processor. It does not reflect externalities at either the upstream or 
downstream party since vertical integration internalizes externalities. 
Therefore, this position neglects, on the one hand, the impact of the 
multiple upstream attributes on the downstream entity, and on the other 
hand, the downstream externalities on the member farms.  
 
The extension of farm view highlights the externalities of farm enterprises 
by gearing attention towards the portfolio of farm activities and assets. The 
investment decisions by farmers, for example, are guided by bringing the 
farms to value and will therefore have an impact on the decisions of the 
cooperative. Nevertheless, the downstream stage of production is 
oversimplified and ignored.  
 
From the perspective of the firm view, the externalities at both the upstream 
farms and the downstream cooperative firm need to be taken into account. 
It entails that decisions regarding various attributes of member farms will 
have an impact on various attributes of the downstream party, and vice 
versa. 
 
Table 3: Characterizing the three views in terms of externalities 
 
A graphic illustration of a cooperative consisting of two members and one 
processor is provided in figure 3. The essence of the agreement members 
enter into involves a commitment on the part of each of them to submit 
certain issues to group decisions (Robotka 1947). Each of these member 
firms remains an independent and autonomous organization in itself. A 
farmer is represented in the figure by a system of three attributes. As an 
example, consider a dairy cooperative. The portfolio of a dairy farmer may 
be characterized by the attributes x1 as his dairy transaction relationship 
with the dairy cooperative (‘delivery requirement’ or ‘no delivery 
 
 Yes No 
Yes Firm view -- 
No Extension of farm  view 
Vertical integration 
 view 
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requirement’), x2 as the ownership of the dairy cooperative (‘member’ or 
‘no member’), and x3 capturing his other farm attributes, e.g. like wheat 
production (‘yes’ or ‘no’). The boundary of a cooperative is visualized by 
the rectangle. Within it lie the processor with all its attributes and two 
attributes of each farmer, i.e. the transaction and ownership attributes. 
Notice that the core of each member firm is outside the rectangle, indicating 
that each member firm is an independent and autonomous enterprise. The 
processor and the part of member farms involved constitute the cooperative 
as a new system. The formation of a new firm, the plurality of interests of 
the extension of the farm view, and the transaction as well as ownership 
relationship between members and the cooperative of the vertical 
integration view are attributes of the new system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A cooperative as a firm 
 
One way to clarify the nature of a cooperative is to compare a franchise 
with a cooperative, as in Bonus (1986). Figure 3 identifies the processor as 
the enterprise, whereas franchising is characterized as “a market contract 
between legally distinct entities” according to Makadok & Coff (2009). The 
parties involved in a cooperative (members and downstream enterprise) are 
also “legally distinct entities”, but the relationship between members and 
the cooperative is looser than the relationship between franchisees and the 
franchise. There are at least three reasons for this assertion. First, a farmer 
is usually a member of various cooperatives due to the various crops grown 
 
 X2 
Members 
Processor 
X3 X3 
X1 X1 X2 
10 
 
at the farm, while a franchisee does not operate in multiple franchise 
systems. A franchisee usually has only one core activity, and consequently 
only one asset from each franchisee is involved. Second, the outlets as well 
as the franchisor carry the brand name in a franchise. In cooperatives only 
the products of the downstream cooperative use the brand name, while the 
products of the member farms do not. Third, cooperatives and franchises 
differ in terms of the principal-agent positions. A cooperative has multiple 
principals (members) and one agent (the cooperative management), while a 
franchise consists of one party being the principal (franchisor) and many 
parties being the agents (the franchisees and the in-house managers). 2 
Principals dictate formally the terms of the relationship. 
 
Figure 3 allows also for classifying research topics regarding cooperatives. 
These themes originate at either the member enterprises, the cooperative 
enterprise, or the relationship between the member enterprise(s) and the 
cooperative enterprise. Issues originating at the member enterprises are the 
portfolio problem, horizon problem, and the single origin constraint. 
Examples of issues originating at the cooperative enterprise due to the joint 
ownership relationship are the control problem, influence problem, tax 
benefits, formal versus real authority, member involvement, finance, 
pooling, and cooperative principles. Finally, issues originating from the 
transaction relationship between members and the cooperative enterprise 
are the elimination of double monopoly markup (double marginalization), 
countervailing power, market access / assurance, contracts (quantity, price, 
quality), free riding, trust, selection, coordination, complementarities, 
member commitment, and social capital. Table 4 summarizes this 
classification of research themes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In this sense a cooperative is more similar to a cooperative franchise where all 
outlets collectively own the brand and the business format (Hendrikse & Jiang 
2007).  
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Themes 
originating at    
member farms 
due to joint ownership 
relationship 
due to joint transaction 
relationship 
Portfolio problem 
Horizon problem 
Single origin 
constraint 
 
Control problem 
Influence problem 
Tax benefits 
Formal/real authority 
Member involvement 
Finance 
Pooling 
Cooperative principles 
 
Double monopoly markup 
Countervailing power 
Market access / assurance 
Contracts 
Free riding 
Trust 
Selection 
Coordination 
Complementarities 
Member commitment 
Social capital 
Table 4. Classifying research themes 
  
1.4 Subsequent views 
The debate is still addressed, explicitly or implicitly, due to conceptual 
developments. Section 1.4.1 focuses on the distinction between decision 
and income rights. Section 1.4.2 highlights the view of researchers 
addressing cooperatives from the perspective of transaction cost economics.  
 
1.4.1 Income and Decision Rights 
Nowadays a governance structure is delineated into ownership rights, 
income rights, and decision rights (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy 2008; 
Grossman & Hart 1986; Hansmann 1996; Hart & Moore 1990). Ownership 
rights specify the formal rights regarding the use of assets. Income rights 
address the question ‘How are benefits and costs allocated?’ They specify 
the rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to pay the costs, 
associated with the use of an asset, thereby creating the incentive system 
faced by decision makers. Finally, decision rights address the question 
‘Who has control (regarding the use of assets)?’3 
                                                 
3 These rights were distinguished earlier in agricultural economics literature. The 
1987 USDA study ‘Positioning Farmer Cooperatives for the Future’ listed them 
prominently in the three basic principles defining a cooperative enterprise: user-
owner, user-control, and user-benefits (Dunn 1988). They are present in the 
definition ‘A cooperative enterprise is one which belongs to the people who use its 
services, the control of which rests with all the members, and the gains of which 
are distributed to the members in proportion to the use they made of its services.’ 
12 
 
Each governance structure represents a unique allocation of ownership, 
income, and decision rights to the involved parties. We focus on different 
allocations of income and decision rights, while keeping the allocation of 
ownership rights fixed. The reason for staying with one ownership structure 
is that the three views on the nature of a cooperative have in common that 
members confirm the ownership over the downstream stage. Therefore, the 
allocation of income and decision rights is used to characterize the three 
views regarding the nature of a cooperative, as well as the market and a 
producer association.4  
 
Suppose there are two farmers, A and B, and a processor, C, and five assets 
{A, a, B, b, C}. Farmer A owns {A, a}, while farmer B owns {B, b}. Asset 
A represents the core activity of farm A, asset B the core activity of farm B, 
and asset C is the only asset of processor C. Assets {a, b} are valuable only 
if they are used together in a coordinated fashion. The decision rights 
concerning the assets are 
Ad , ad , Bd , bd  and Cd , while the profits generated 
from these assets are represented by the income rights AS , aS , BS , bS  and 
CS . The allocation of decision and income rights characterizing the various 
governance structures are presented in table 5. 
  
                                                                                                                           
(U.S. Government 1937).  
4 The Association is often referred to as bargaining cooperative. 
13 
 
 Party A  
holds 
Party B  
holds 
Party C  
holds 
Party A & B  
hold jointly 
Cooperative 
(extension of 
farm view) 
Ad , ad , AS , aS  Bd , bd , BS , bS  -- Cd , CS  
Cooperative 
(vertical 
integration 
view) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Ad , AS , ad , aS , 
Bd , BS , bd , bS , 
Cd , CS  
Coordinated 
cooperative 
(firm view) 
Ad , AS  Bd , BS  -- ad , aS , bd , bS , 
Cd , CS  
Uncoordinated 
cooperative 
(firm view) 
Ad , AS , ad  Bd , BS , bd  -- aS , bS , 
Cd , CS  
market 
Ad , ad , AS , aS  Bd , bd , BS , bS  Cd , CS  -- 
Association 
Ad , AS  Bd , BS  Cd , CS  ad , aS , bd , bS  
Table 5: Characterizing governance structures in terms of income and 
decision rights 
 
The core of the extension of the farm view is that each member not only 
owns all his assets, but also has complete individual control over the 
income and decision rights over these assets. Vertical integration is featured 
in the literature generally by concepts such as common governance and 
leadership, joint planning, centralized decision making, and transfer of 
decisions to a distinct entity in charge of coordinating their actions. All the 
income and decision rights are pooled together. From the firm view, 
members pool together only some of their assets {a, b}, while retaining 
complete autonomy with respect to all their other activities. As owners, they 
possess the income rights associated with the cooperative assets. The 
decision rights are generally exercised by them in an indirect way through 
voting for the board of directors, who then selects the presiding officers and 
hires a CEO to manage the cooperative. Furthermore, many cooperatives 
use quantity (e.g. a delivery requirement) as a mechanism of coordination 
between upstream growers and the downstream processor. We label this 
governance structure as a coordinated cooperative. An uncoordinated 
cooperative refers to a cooperative without delivery obligation, namely, 
each upstream farm decides upon the quantity it will deliver to the 
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downstream processor. This governance structure uses price as a 
coordination mechanism. So the decision rights over the assets {a, b} are 
retained with the members, while the profits generated from them are 
pooled in the cooperative. 
 
The allocation of decision rights and income rights in a market and an 
association are also specified in table 5. In market transaction, each party 
possesses all the rights concerning their own assets and no assets are pooled. 
Two farmers may decide to form an association, which either grades, 
packages, handles, and stores the products together; or bargains, negotiates 
and contracts as an entity with processors or retailers with respect to the 
processing, shipping or marketing of the output. They join their assets {a, b} 
and transact together with another party C. 
 
The separation of ownership rights and decision rights which are prominent 
in a cooperative in fact also prevail in IOFs. A typical IOF assigns its 
formal rights of control to its owners, capital providers, while the real 
authority is usually exerted by the hired management of the firm. The 
income rights allocation in cooperatives and IOFs are also essentially the 
same. From the perspective of decision rights and income rights allocation, 
a cooperative is comparable to a conventional firm, which is always 
analyzed as an autonomous entity, rather than the extension of the investors 
or investing firms. Notice that this feature is recognized in the legal 
vestment of IOFs and cooperatives. They are both incorporated in most 
countries. 
 
Despite of the similarity, a cooperative is not identical to an IOF. To 
highlight the differences, we present in figure 4 an investor owned dairy 
enterprise. Its difference with figure 3 is that the investors have only one 
attribute involved with the dairy enterprise. The delivery of milk is not a 
relevant attribute of the investors, i.e. x1 has to represent another aspect of 
the portfolio of activities or assets of the investors. In other words, a 
cooperative is distinguished from an IOF by the attribute that its owners are 
also its input suppliers or buyers. This difference is recognized in their 
incorporation. IOFs and cooperatives are usually incorporated in different 
ways. Summarizing, a cooperative is conceptualized as a firm consisting of 
attributes capturing (1) the processor as a system of attributes; (2) many 
farmers collectively own the cooperative enterprise, i.e. the vertical 
integration aspect; (3) usually multiple attributes of a farm enterprise are 
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involved, i.e. the extension of the farm aspect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An investor owned firm 
 
1.4.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
An influential approach to governance is transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1991). It distinguishes three generic governance structures: 
market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The governance structure market is 
populated with firms, like the IOF in figure 4 and the firm view represented 
in table 3. A hierarchy is similar to vertical integration in table 3. Ménard 
(2007) characterizes a hybrid by pooling resources, contracting with 
members, and competition among members. A hybrid represents the 
extension of the farm view. 
 
Williamson (2004) explicitly dismisses the view that characterizes a 
cooperative as vertical integration. He associates vertical integration with 
ownership by one party, while collective ownership is a crucial aspect of a 
cooperative. By highlighting the collection of growers, rather than the 
downstream enterprise, he takes a position close to the extension of farm 
view. This is in line with Bonus (1986, p335) when he summarizes his 
position as ‘The cooperative association is a hybrid organizational mode 
…’, although he states later on the same page that a cooperative is ‘… a 
firm jointly owned by the holders of transaction-specific resources’. 
 
Processor 
Investors
X3 X3 X1 X1 
X2 X2 
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Ménard (2007) categorizes the cooperative as a hybrid. According to this 
paper, what distinguishes a hybrid from a hierarchy is that ‘they maintain 
distinct and autonomous property and decision rights regarding most assets’ 
(p5). Yet ‘they simultaneously share some strategic resources, which 
require a tight coordination going far beyond what the price system can 
provide and thus makes them different from a pure market arrangement’ 
(p5). These observations depict an association rather than a coordinated 
cooperative according to table 3. Both governance structures involve 
pooling of assets, but what distinguishes the latter from the former is the 
downstream stage of production. A cooperative as a hierarchy emphasizes 
an enterprise owned by the upstream members. 
 
The title ‘Cooperative Enterprise’ indicates already that Vitaliano (1983) 
characterizes a cooperative as a firm. This is reinforced by referring to the 
cooperative as a ‘modern, complex cooperative corporation’ (p1078) and 
‘an economic organization whose residual claims are restricted to the agent 
group that supplies patronage under the organization’s nexus of contracts 
(i.e., the member-patrons) and whose board of directors is selected by this 
same group’ (p1079). The first sentence of chapter 7 of Hansmann (1996, 
p120) is outspoken about the cooperative being a firm by stating ‘there are 
three common types of producer-owned enterprise: investor-owned, 
worker-owned, and farmer-owned’. It elaborates on his previous position 
(Hansmann 1988, p270) that ‘a standard business corporation is normally 
owned by investors, persons who lend capital to the firm, and is in a sense 
nothing more than a special type of producer cooperative -- a lenders’ 
cooperative, or capital cooperative.’ Hendrikse & Veerman (2001a) are in 
line with this view by classifying a cooperative as a hierarchy.  
 
1.5 Conclusions and further research 
Conceptual developments since the observation by Ward, cited at the 
beginning of this article, have allowed us to review an old debate about the 
nature of a cooperative. The literature is classified in terms of three views: a 
cooperative as an extension of the farm, as vertical integration, and as a 
firm. Using the system of attributes perspective, we have formulated a 
framework that provides a unified account of the differences between these 
views. They differ by the upstream and downstream externalities being 
delineated, the number of upstream and downstream attributes being 
considered, and the allocation of income and decision rights. 
 
17 
 
Clarifying the nature of a cooperative is important because it will frame the 
subsequent analysis and results. The results may assist in formulating 
public policies, particularly competition policies that either grant 
cooperatives a special status, or classify them as anti-competitive in terms 
of a cartel or a vertical restraint. Recent discussions on the legal status of 
cooperatives in the European Union are an illustration (Ménard 2007). 
Cooperatives may also benefit because these concepts may be helpful in 
addressing a variety of issues, like member commitment, transfer prices, 
sourcing, restructuring, and diversification. 
 
We favor the cooperative as a firm position, highlighting that a cooperative 
is collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers. It 
follows that the decisions regarding at least some attributes of member 
farms are made by the individual farmer only, while the decisions regarding 
the other attributes and the attributes of the cooperative are made by the 
members collectively. This view entails some preferences about future 
research on cooperatives. 
 
First, future research may pay explicit attention to the unique aspects of the 
members owning the cooperative compared with investors as owners of an 
IOF. A cooperative is supposed both to serve member interests and to 
generate maximum value in processing. Nearly always being user oriented 
(Barton 1989), a cooperative is designed for the former task, and because 
the organizational structure required for the two tasks is different, it is 
expected to have an impact on the latter task. An example is a feature of 
cooperatives known as the portfolio problem. An important consideration of 
members in the diversification decision of a cooperative may be spreading 
of risks of their individual farm portfolio, which may result in members ‘… 
will pressure cooperative decision makers to rearrange the cooperative’s 
investment portfolio, even if the reduced risk portfolio means lower 
expected returns’ (Cook 1995, p1157). It implies that a cooperative 
diversifies most likely in a different way than an IOF. More information 
about the relationship between the farm portfolio of members and the 
product portfolio of a cooperative seems therefore desirable. Census data 
may shed light on this relationship. Another example of the upstream 
externalities on the cooperative firm is that a farmer is usually a member of 
various cooperatives. These cooperatives may be one-product cooperatives, 
or multiple-product cooperatives. For example, sugar cooperative Royal 
Cosun (Netherlands) processes (mainly) sugar beets and (some) vegetables. 
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Some of the members have a transaction and investor relationship with 
Royal Cosun regarding the sugar beets, while they only have a transaction 
relation with Royal Cosun regarding the other vegetables. The desirability 
of this arrangement is not clear. 
 
Second, collective ownership of a cooperative requires a method for 
collective decision-making. Most cooperatives adhere to a one-member-
one-vote scheme, but sometimes votes are weighted by volume of 
patronage. A problem with these democratic decision-making procedures is 
that they may yield decisions that are (collectively) inefficient in the sense 
that they do not maximize aggregate member surplus (Hart & Moore 1996). 
It entails that decision power is to a certain extent allocated independently 
of quantity or quality. Analyzing collective ownership requires therefore 
that a model specifies at least two members and a downstream party. This is 
a necessity to investigate the plurality of interests prevailing in cooperative 
decision making. 
 
Third, the efficient choice of governance structure (ownership, decision, 
and income rights) has to match the situation facing the enterprise. We have 
highlighted a number of choices regarding income and decision rights, 
given that the ownership rights are allocated to farmers. These choice 
possibilities create substantial flexibility within the ownership structure of a 
cooperative to adapt to new circumstances. In order to remain as important 
as in the past, cooperatives have to evaluate regularly the balance between 
their income and decision rights. Other choices regarding ownership rights 
may also be considered, like contract farming, in order to bring the produce 
of farms to value.  
 
1.6 Overview of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to three aspects of the 
governance of cooperatives. Chapter 2 and 3 start with the motivation issue 
of cooperative CEOs. Chapter 4 deals with the coordination issue in the 
production and supply chain. Finally, the effect of limited cognition is 
explored in chapter 5. The efficient governance structure is identified in 
each chapter that follows.  
 
We propose in chapter 2 that the differences in the performance of 
cooperatives and publicly listed firms do not necessarily result from the 
character or abilities of the management, but from the characteristics of the 
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governance structures. A multi-task principal-agent model is developed to 
capture that a cooperative is not publicly listed and that it has to bring the 
enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. Results are 
formulated on the sensitivity of the optimal incentive intensity with regard 
to the membership composition and to the composition of performance 
measure. The alignment between the performance measure and the 
production function is emphasized. It is beneficial for an IOF to implement 
an equity-based compensation, a pay scheme sensitive to any single 
performance measure will lead to misalignment and inefficiency in 
cooperatives. Our results show that the absence of public listing, often 
believed to be a disadvantage of cooperatives, may make a cooperative the 
unique efficient governance structure when additional sources of 
information are available, like accounting information and subjective 
performance evaluations.  
 
Chapter 3 continues to addresses the motivation issue in the multi-task 
principal-agent setting. There we focus on the effects of interdependencies 
between the upstream and downstream activities and strategic performance 
measure choice. We determine the circumstances when the absence of 
public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the 
unique efficient governance structure. Not having a public listing prevents 
the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. 
Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product 
multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain 
complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the impact of governance structure on the choice of 
coordination mechanism in a chain. The governance structures cooperative 
and IOF are distinguished. Whether the price or quantity mechanism is 
efficient depends on the choice of governance structure and the slopes of 
the marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue (MR) curve. We show that 
the cooperative chooses the efficient coordination mechanism while the 
IOFs do not always do so. The underlying reason is that the cooperative 
internalizes the vertical externalities between upstream producers and the 
downstream processor whereas the IOFs do not. The slope of the MC and 
MR decides whether the price or quantity mechanism is used in a 
cooperative. Each governance structure can be uniquely efficient, 
contingent on the relative accurateness of the MC and MR estimates.  
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Chapter 5 attempts to gain a better understanding of the governance 
structure choice in a bounded cognition framework. The influence of 
governance structures (market, cooperative, forward integration, and 
backward integration) on the information partition of boundedly rational 
agents is examined. Our characterization of the governance structures 
captures on the one hand the way they channel attention and cognition, and 
on the other hand the distinct ownership distributions. It entails that every 
governance structure is associated with a specific bias. Each governance 
structure can be efficient, depending on the probabilities of the various 
states and the size of the potential benefit and loss. We also show that a 
cooperative processor is more conservative than other agents in proposal 
selection when the probability associated with the upstream state is high. 
 
The present dissertation contributes to existing cooperative research in 
several ways. First, we classify research topics regarding cooperatives into 
three categories (themes originating at either the member enterprises, the 
cooperative enterprise, or the relationship between the members and the 
cooperative enterprise. Some of the topics are addressed subsequently. 
Second, a cooperative has various special features that distinguish it from 
other governance structures. We show from various perspectives that these 
features are in fact desirable, despite the widespread belief that they are not, 
making the cooperative a uniquely efficient governance structure. Finally, 
the results are established in a highly stylized model, which provides a start 
for developing additional arguments for the widespread occurrence of 
cooperatives. Assumptions can be relaxed to capture a more accurate 
picture of the cooperative and new hypotheses can be formulated based on 
our propositions. The dissertation has also implications for the managerial 
practice of cooperative regarding managerial performance and 
compensation, supply coordination, and diversification and innovation 
management.   
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Chapter 2 
Performance Measurement and the  
Efficiency of Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms   
 
2.1 Introduction  
A substantial amount of research has focused on how an optimal 
performance measure can help rectify the agency problem in IOFs, 
especially publicly listed companies, whereas the CEO compensation in 
other governance structures, for example cooperatives, has received hardly 
attention. This can be justified to a certain extent because the members-
CEO relationship in cooperatives is similar to the investors-CEO 
relationship in IOFs. Traditionally, the cooperative board of directors, 
democratically chosen by and from the membership, was the main body 
governing the activities and investments of the cooperative firm. As the 
cooperative grows, the tasks facing the cooperative management call for 
strategies or judgment far beyond the experience and competence of most 
members, professional qualified management is hired to operate the firm. 
As a result, the members exercise their authority mainly by critically 
following the policies of the management, rather than by giving it 
directions (Trifon 1961). Members would like to maximize their benefits 
derived from the cooperatives, while the management is likely to pursue 
objectives of organizational growth maximization, subject to continuity and 
employment security (Vitaliano 1983). This is similar in an IOF. 
 
Despite of the similarities, the situation in cooperatives is more complex 
than a standard principal-agent relationship. First, it is difficult to assess the 
top manager’s contributions to a company due to the complexity of his 
tasks (Blanchard et al. 1996). The tasks of a cooperative CEO are even 
more complex due to the ‘cooperative’s goal of jointly maximizing member 
and cooperative returns’ (Peterson & Anderson 1996, p376). Members are 
users in addition to owners of the firm. They have at least two sets of 
concerns: owner concerns and user concerns. Owner concerns revolve 
around the security and overall profitability of their investments in the 
cooperative. User concerns include issues of the pricing and quality of 
product and services, which influence the profitability of their individual 
farm enterprise (Staatz 1987). These two concerns are reflected in the 
members’ expectation regarding the management. Given those additional 
complexities in cooperatives, designing a contract ensuring the mutual 
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compatibility of a cooperative’s goals and the CEO’s incentives has to be 
even more difficult. 
 
Second, a managerial incentive contract is based on a performance 
measurement system, creating incentives that align the goal of the agent 
with that of the organization. However, there are no simple indicators of 
cooperative managerial performance or automatic incentive systems (such 
as a stock price) to close the gap in interests. Giving a CEO equity, a 
common way to tie the CEO’s wealth to firm performance and thus to 
alleviate the interests conflict in IOFs, is not feasible in cooperatives. The 
reason is that a cooperative CEO is not eligible to hold equity in the 
business and receives only limited benefits from such ownership given the 
fact that most cooperative stock does not appreciate in value (Trechter et al. 
1997). Trechter et al. (1997) document that CEO compensation schemes in 
cooperatives vary. Some use pre-set performance-based bonuses, some 
allow for bonuses paid on past performance, and others do not use bonuses. 
 
Third, there is a group of principals whose interests differ. The variety of 
members embodies aspects like size, location, risk aversion, attitude 
towards innovation, growth potential, member involvement, and financial 
contribution to the cooperative. Due to the heterogeneity, the cooperative 
does not have one locus for profit maximization but a separate locus for 
each member, giving rise to a host of problems that attend collective choice 
(Staatz 1987). Problems are manifested in debates not only about pricing, 
financing and pooling policies, but also in the difficulty to achieve 
consensus regarding specific performance targets (Hueth & Marcoul 2008). 
When colliding interests exist among principals, the agent’s tasks involve 
devising workable compromises and acting as a neutral guardian of 
everybody’s priorities (Trifon 1961).  
 
Acknowledging these complexities, some researchers doubt the efficiency 
of cooperatives and argue that cooperatives suffer from a host of problems 
unique to this specific form of governance. Stewart (1993) even asserts that 
a business cannot be successfully run if its customers or suppliers are 
deeply involved in running it because there is too much conflict of interest. 
Yet, cooperatives and IOFs coexist in many sectors of most modern 
economies and compete for market share, especially in the agricultural 
sector where cooperatives have played an active role for a very long time in 
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many countries (Hendrikse 2007b).5 Many of today’s cooperatives have 
existed for decades, and new co-operatives are continually being 
established throughout the world (Nilsson 2001). These observations 
inspire the following questions: How is the cooperative CEO compensation 
determined by the special features of its governance structure? When is a 
cooperative (with its member ownership and its lack of public listing) 
uniquely efficient? These questions are addressed with a multi-task 
principal-agent model. 
 
One way to position the article is that it is in line with the current 
theoretical developments regarding the principal-agent model. The classic 
principal-agent model highlights the trade-off between the incentives and 
risk. The analysis is focussed on one task.6 One development has been that 
nowadays a trade-off is considered between the incentives intensity and the 
allocation of attention among various activities (Baker 2000). The other 
development is that repeated principal-agent relationships are considered 
(Gibbons 2005). This article is to be positioned along the former as we 
consider a model where the agent allocates his attention over upstream and 
downstream activities. This is also in line with the business management 
literature stressing that efficient organization requires that managers be 
given specific objectives and their performance be monitored, measured, 
and rewarded in relation to them (Drucker 1974). Another way to position 
the article is that a variety of corporate forms has to be considered when 
studying the nature of the firm (Hansmann 1985, 1988). A cooperative is 
viewed as an informative counterfactual for the much studied publicly-
listed corporation. Finally, a cooperative has various special features which 
distinguish it from other governance structures. One of the objectives of 
research regarding cooperatives is to show that these features may actually 
be desirable, despite the widespread belief that they are not. In this article 
we demonstrate that the absence of a public listing, often believed as a 
disadvantage of cooperatives, can make a cooperative uniquely efficient. 
 
This article is organized as follows. The next section elaborates on various 
differences between cooperatives and publicly listed firms. Section 2.3 
                                                 
5 Ballou (2005) studies governance structure variety in the nursing home industry, 
while Kwoka (2002) analyzes mixed markets in the electric power industry. 
6 Ziv (1993) is an example of this setting with a focus on performance measures 
and optimal organization. 
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formulates a multi-task principal-agent model and tailors it to the 
differences between cooperatives and IOFs. Extensions are analyzed in 
section 2.4, like the impact of the membership (in terms of size and 
heterogeneity) and costly performance measurement. Additional 
information in the performance measure (accounting data and subjective 
performance measurements) is highlighted in section 2.5. Finally, section 
2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Comparing cooperatives with publicly listed firms 
This section compares cooperatives with publicly listed firms regarding 
member value (2.2.1) and governance structure (2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 Member value 
Members own a cooperative to achieve certain commercial and social 
objectives (LeVay 1983; Barton 1989). Peterson & Anderson (1996, p375) 
observe that ‘because of its goal to maximize value to members, a 
cooperative will consider its members’ farm asset returns and not just its 
own.’ This observation is due to members being owners as well as users. 
Members are concerned with both the value added at the cooperative firm 
and at their own farm enterprises, and want to motivate their CEO to bring 
the outputs at both stages jointly to maximum value. In accordance with 
Hind (1997) who distinguishes corporate-oriented aspirations and member-
centered goals, we categorize member value into value added at the 
cooperative firm and value added to the farm enterprises. 
 
Value added at the cooperative firm  
As the owners and investors, and consequently the residual claimants, 
members receive dividends from the cooperative. Thus they care about the 
financial performance of the cooperative in the same way as the investors 
of an IOF. Moreover, the flow of information from the producers to the 
processor could be better in cooperatives than in IOFs, leading cooperatives 
to be more responsive to members’ needs or to better product specifications. 
A cooperative usually has a patron list and collects a substantial amount of 
information about member’s preference, needs, production practices, and 
advice about products and services through periodic member surveys. The 
members may be more willing to provide higher quality, more frequent, and 
more truthful information to the cooperative than they would to an IOF 
(Cook 1994) because as owners they are more assured that the cooperative 
would not use the information to act opportunistically toward them (Staatz 
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1987). Another reason lies in the fact that ‘exit’ is a more expensive option 
for cooperative members than the patrons of IOFs (Cook 1994). 
Furthermore, an IOF CEO is usually in a position of strong control over 
both setting and implementing company policies, while in cooperatives, the 
board of directors, as representatives of members, are significantly more 
independent and would go a long way towards monitoring the CEO. They 
do not feel beholden to question management decisions and to reject its 
recommendations (USDA, 2002). 
 
Value added to the upstream farms and their owners  
Staatz (1987) observes that members are vitally interested in the 
cooperative’s pricing of goods and services, not simply in its overall 
financial performance. Being users, they are able to exert a higher influence 
on the operation and management of the firm than the investors of an IOF 
are, and consequently can receive more favorable prices. Members benefit 
from the cooperative also in terms of services, which affect the profitability 
of their individual farm enterprise. For instance, when an individual farmer 
cannot afford to do consumer research related to the characteristics of farm 
commodities, it might be feasible for a cooperative to do so. An investor-
owned marketing agency has little incentive to do it because it cannot 
capture the benefits that accrue to farmers (Shaffer 1987). Moreover, the 
changes in cooperative profits can offset changes in member profits over 
expected market cycles. Peterson & Anderson (1996) report evidence that 
some cooperatives take a conservative strategy by ‘saving’ returns in good 
economic times for ‘payout’ in poor economic times. Next to that, 
cooperatives also prove to be an assured source of supplies (Barton 1989) 
and a reliable ‘home’ for farm produce, reducing risk to members (Lang 
1994). Members’ value as users is also reflected in the cooperative’s 
diversification behaviors. A cooperative never abandons the activities 
concerning the majority of its members. Farmer cooperatives concentrate 
their investments in agribusiness and their assets are closely tied to the 
assets of their members as the members might suffer substantial capital 
losses if their farming activities were not adequately supported. In addition 
to the vertical information exchange that benefit the cooperative firm, 
cooperatives also create a territorially based forum for information 
exchange (LeVay 1983) where members can more easily communicate 
among each other. Shared information about safe pest control and other 
environmental concerns is a prime example (Peterson & Anderson 1996). 
There are various explanations for the dominance of user value in the 
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perception of members. On the one hand, the limitation on dividend 
payments and the members’ inability to capture capital gains in a 
cooperative may account for member’s preference to direct benefits in the 
form of transfer prices (Staatz 1987). On the other hand, the frequency of 
transactions may play a role. Members are users on an almost daily basis, 
while being owner-investors only several times a year (tax day, equity 
redemption day, dividend day). This frequent use interface relative to the 
investor interface reinforces a constant message that price and quality of the 
cooperative’s services and goods affect the members’ bottom line, which is 
more important (in the short run and for the individual member) than the 
bottom line of the cooperative (Cook 1994).  
 
Although members join the cooperative primarily for economic reasons, 
they pursue noneconomic objectives as well, by deriving social value from 
being ‘a member of an association’. ‘Benefits of social value include all 
noneconomic results or outcomes of major interest or importance to 
stakeholders, including the satisfaction many of them experience through 
the association, unity, and involvement characteristics of member-
controlled organizations. Some members like being involved with others to 
achieve a common purpose. Some members also like electing or serving as 
directors’ (Barton 1989, p7). Members’ social value takes various forms. 
For example, identity preservation can be a source (Lang 1994). Identity 
influences economic choices and outcomes, accounting for many 
phenomena that go beyond a standard economic explanation. Cooperative 
members have different orientation in life than IOF shareholders. 
Cooperation is known to appeal to people not merely as a means of running 
a business but also as an instrument of social amelioration (LeVay 1983). 
Human beings have a strong need to belong, either to a society or to a 
profession. Forming a community may appear to be a way of bolstering a 
sense of self or salving a diminished self-image (Akerlof & Kranton 2000). 
Through various socialization processes like member training and member 
relations programs, members work together, learn together, celebrate 
together, and share their experiences together, generalizing ‘feelings of 
family’ to the entire membership. The result is that members feel more 
cheerful, more confident and stronger, both in the market and in the society.  
 
2.2.2 Governance 
Most public-listed firms mitigate principal-agent conflicts via incentive 
contracts that link pay to performance, whereas the complexity in 
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measuring cooperative performance often creates vagueness and lack of 
clarity in the eyes of members (Cook 1994). An optimal incentive contract 
for cooperative CEOs is therefore most likely different from the contract for 
an IOF CEO. First of all, the ‘plethora of objectives’ of members who differ 
in various aspects makes the identification of the cooperative’s objective 
function one of the most challenging and delicate tasks (Cook 1994). 
Yamay (1950) realizes that ‘the manager of a capitalist enterprise knows 
what it should try to maximize and for whom, the management of a co-
operative society has a choice of what it should try to maximize (or 
minimize) and for whom’. The shareholders of a public listed firm may be a 
diverse group as well, but capital markets with a sufficiently rich menu of 
assets align their interests (Dixit 1997). They are mostly interested in the 
appreciation of their shares whereas the value of input suppliers is not 
relevant. In a cooperative, as membership grows more heterogeneous, 
different groups within the organization pressure management to respond to 
their particular interests. Because of the broader, more diffuse scope of 
optimization in a cooperative (Staatz 1987), single indicators such as ROI 
(Return On Investment) are less meaningful as measures of organizational 
and managerial performance (Cook 1994). Thirkell (1993) argues that the 
use of organizational profit for measuring performance in a cooperative is 
not only unnecessary but also often downright misleading. If the objective 
is member benefit rather than financial performance of members’ 
investment in the cooperative, then it is member benefit that should be 
measured, not the cooperative's conventional corporate performance. In 
other words, market requirements that best serve profitability goals of an 
IOF may not directly serve the immediate interests of all cooperative 
members due to member heterogeneity. Simply examining traditional 
financial statement data will not be adequate. If a pure market-driven 
approach is taken, members with less marketable inputs may not, compared 
to other members, feel their needs are well met (Lang 1994).  
 
Secondly, there is no objective third-party indicator (besides members and 
the CEO) such as secondary markets for cooperative stock to evaluate 
performance (Cook 1994). Investors of IOFs want to receive the highest 
possible return on their investment, and this return can be expressed in the 
stock price. In other words, an IOF CEO’s contribution to firm value is 
equivalent to the change in the shareholders’ wealth through appreciation of 
the stock. Fluctuation in the stock price serves as an influential disciplining 
mechanism on management, indicating the extent to which the stockholders 
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are content with current managerial policies. Many firms reinforce the 
potency by offering stock options to CEOs, making their earnings 
contingent on the stock’s value. Cooperatives lack this external mechanism 
for disciplining management. There is no public financial assessment of the 
performance of a cooperative and therefore of its CEO. Members are 
radically concerned with the surplus in the form of improved terms of trade, 
i.e. the prices the cooperative pays for the goods from members or it 
charges for its services. It is therefore difficult to operationalize goals or to 
assess goal attainment (Nilsson 2001). The prices cannot be used as the sole 
performance measure, otherwise the CEO may be induced to decapitalize 
the firm in an attempt to increase his current earning, simply reinforcing the 
horizon problem (Staatz 1987).  
 
According to Hind (1997), as time progresses and the cooperative ages, the 
issues of member service benefit would not be the sole goal of the business 
but that corporate-oriented objectives would become increasingly important. 
Cooperatives look therefore for alternative measure to stock price to 
evaluate how the corporate-oriented objectives are fulfilled. Accounting 
return measures and subjective performance measures are among the 
options. We will investigate the impact of adding these additional sources 
of information in the performance measure. 
 
There are a few sources providing information about performance 
measurement in cooperatives. First, Trechter et al. (1997) observe that some 
cooperatives use equity redemption as a percentage of total equity and 
patronage refunds per member as factors of the financial performance 
measure, and some cooperatives link their CEOs bonuses to accounting 
measures (such as accounts receivable) that are only weakly related to the 
cooperatives’  long-term goals. There are also cooperatives that do not even 
set long-term goals or formal long-term planning procedure and goal-
setting sessions. Second, in 2008 Michael Cook has indicated to us that his 
experience with various cooperatives regarding the compensation contract 
for a cooperative CEO often specifies around 10 performance indicators, 
one of them being member satisfaction. Third, one cooperative has been 
willing to provide us with the details of the determinants of the CEO bonus. 
On October 14, 2008 the head of the personnel department of a dairy 
cooperative communicated to us that the CEO bonus has a long run and a 
short run component. The long run component is exclusively related to the 
milk price relative to a peer group of 6 other cooperatives. It captures two 
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features of the interests of the members. First, the price received by the 
dairy farmers is a crucial aspect of the relationship between the farmers and 
the processor. Four levels of the bonus are specified, related to ranking first, 
second, third, or lower in the peer group. Second, continuity of the 
processor is important to the dairy farmers. This is captured to a certain 
extent by the fact that the ranking is determined as an average over three 
years. The short run component consists of three indicators related to EBIT 
(Earnings Before Interest & Tax) and goals formulated with respect to costs. 
 
2.3 Cooperatives versus IOFs 
A multi-task principal-agent model (Gibbons 1998) consisting of a two-
stage non-cooperative game is presented in this section. In the first stage, 
the principal chooses the strength of incentives while the agent’s optimal 
choice of activities is determined in the second stage. Assume that the CEO 
in governance structure i (C for cooperative and F for IOF) can take two 
actions: 1ia denoting the action to advance the downstream value, and 2ia  
denoting the action adding value to the upstream producers. The CEO’s 
total contribution to firm value is denoted by iy . The marginal product of 
action jia is jif . The production function is 1 1 2 2i i i i iy f a f a H   , where H is 
a stochastic variable with expected value of 0, representing the noise in the 
production process that is beyond the agent’s control.7  
 
Given the difficulty in measuring the overall effect of the CEO’s actions on 
firm value, no compensation contract based on iy  can be enforced in court. 
From this, it follows that an alternative performance measure ip  becomes 
necessary. Suppose the technology of performance measurement takes the 
form of 1 1 2 2g a g ai i i i ip I   , where jig  denotes the performance 
measurement parameter, i.e. the weight attached to jia , and I  denotes the 
noise in performance measurement with expected value of 0. 
 
Suppose the compensation contract in governance structure i specifies the 
wage iw  paid to the CEO as a linear function of ip , i.e. i i i iw s b p  , where 
                                                 
7 We assume the actions taken by the CEO only have consequences for the 
principal, which excludes the possibility for tunnelling and the CEO directly 
benefiting from acting against the interests of the principal. 
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is  stands for the salary and ib  for the bonus rate. The CEO’s payoff is the 
difference between the wage and the cost of actions: 1 2( , )i i i i iU w c a a  . 
Assume that the cost function takes the form of 2 21 2 1 2( , ) ( ) / 2i i i i ic a a a a  . 
The principal receives the difference between the CEO’s total contribution 
to firm value and the CEO’s wage: i i iy wS   . Notice that with this 
specification, the CEO’s incentives are to produce a high value of ip , not 
of iy , whereas the principal does not directly benefit from increased 
realizations of measured performance ip , rather, he benefits from increased 
realizations of the CEO’s total contribution iy . As a result, the incentives 
may be distorted. To minimize the distortion the principal has to minimize 
the divergence between ip  and iy . 
 
The game is solved by backward induction. The CEO’s optimal action in 
the second stage is determined by maximizing his expected utility, i.e.
1 2,
max ( )
i i
ia a
E U , where 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) [ ( , )] (g a g a ) ( , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE U E w c a a s b c a a      . 
The first order condition /i ji i jib g c a w w , j = 1,2, characterizes the CEO’s 
equilibrium actions * ( )ji i i jia b b g . The payoff-maximizing reply in the 
second stage is anticipated in the first stage when the principal determines 
the efficient intensity of incentives. Maximizing the expected total surplus 
max ( )
i
i ib
E US  , where * * * *1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) [ ( , )] ( , )i i i i i i i i i i i i iE U E y c a a f a f a c a aS        
results in the efficient bonus rate 
2 2
* 1 21 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
cos( )i ii i i ii i
i i i i
f ff g f gb
g g g g
T   
, 
where θi is the angle between the vectors 1 2( , )i i if f f{  and  1 2( , )i i ig g g{ as 
depicted in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The scale and alignment effect of the performance measure 
 
There are two important features in the expression of efficient bonus rate, 
scale and alignment. More specifically, 2 2 2 21 2 1 2/i i i if f g g  reflects the 
relative scale of if and ig . A high 2 2 2 21 2 1 2/i i i if f g g  indicates that the 
weights of actions is higher in the production function than in the 
performance measure. As a result, the firm will optimally increase the 
incentive intensity based on such a performance measure. Cos(θi) captures 
the alignment effect. To the extent that the performance measure induces 
CEO’s actions less aligned with firm value, θ will increase, and the 
performance measure will distort incentives more (Baker 2000). As a result, 
the firm will optimally reduce the incentive intensity.  
 
Next we identify the differences between a cooperative and an IOF in terms 
of restrictions on the parameters in the production function and 
performance measure. First, the CEO’s contribution to firm value depends 
on organizational form. In cooperatives, it is equivalent to the change in 
total member value. Members want to bring both upstream farms and the 
downstream cooperative to value, i.e. 1 20, 0C Cf f! ! . Investors of an IOF 
processor care only about value added to the downstream stage, i.e. 
1 20, 0F Ff f!  . Second, the performance measures of IOFs and 
cooperatives differ. It is common in IOFs that the CEO’s bonus is paid in 
the form of firm shares, i.e. 1 20, 0F Fg g!  . This instrument is lacking in 
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i 
cooperatives and we capture this by 1 0Cg  .8 However, member interests 
are usually present in the incentive scheme for a cooperative CEO, e.g. by 
benchmarking the transfer price or production volume. This results in 
2 0Cg ! . To wrap up, members’ plurality of interests is represented by 
2 0Cf ! , while the absence of patron-members, and therefore serving their 
interests, in an IOF is represented by 2 0Fg  . The absence of public listing 
of a cooperative is embodied by 1 0Cg  , while the use of the stock price in 
an IOF’s performance measure is captured by 1 0Fg ! . The distinct features 
of two governance structures are displayed in table 1 and figure 2.  
 
 F C 
1if  >0 >0 
2if  0 >0 
1ig  >0 0 
2ig  0 >0 
 
Table 1: Marginal product and performance measure parameters 
 
                                                 
8 We are not stating that a cooperative has no information at all about the 
downstream activities, but our model will focus on the impact of lacking certain 
information. 
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Figure 2: Scale and alignment differences between a coop and an IOF 
 
Plugging these parameter values in the expressions of efficient bonus rates 
results in * 1 1/F F Fb f g , * 2 2/C C Cb f g . Subsequently, the CEO’s 
equilibrium actions are determined *1 1F Fa f , *2 0Fa   and *1 0Ca  , 
*
2 2C Ca f . As shown in figure 2, the production function and performance 
measure are perfectly aligned in an IOF, while they are not in a cooperative. 
In equilibrium, an IOF CEO has incentives to undertake only 1Fa  because 
the investors care only about 1Fa   and make the CEO’s pay dependent only 
on 1Fa . Members of cooperatives, however, appreciate the CEO’s actions 
on both dimensions but are able to compensate only for 2Ca . Thus, only an 
incentive to increase 2Ca  is created and no incentive for 1Ca  exists even 
though it would increase firm value. In other words, when an action 
increases the member value without simultaneously increasing the 
performance measure, the CEO has no incentives to pay attention to it. 
When the available performance measures are incomplete, the incentive 
contract will lead to problems of distortion, or in ‘the folly of rewarding A 
while hoping for B’ (Kerr 1975). With the complex and sometimes 
ambiguous goals of cooperatives, the incentive contact may provide only a 
partial representation of its objectives. The misalignment between the 
performance measure and the production function persuades the CEO to 
pay unbalanced attention to actions that positively affect their scores on the 
performance measures, neglecting areas for which performance is not 
assessed.  
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A fair comparison of the efficiency of the two governance structures entails 
comparing the value created by a cooperative with the joint value created 
by a downstream (D) and an upstream IOF (U). For this purpose, we 
assume that the marginal product and the performance measurement 
parameter of each activity remain the same across different governance 
structure. Therefore the above results become *C 2 2/b f g , *D 1 1/b f g , 
*
1D 1a f , *2D 0a  , *1C 0a  , *2C 2a f . Similarly, the equilibrium results for 
an upstream IOF are *U 2 2/b f g , *1U 0a  , and *2U 2a f . Simple 
calculations show that the total surplus of a cooperative and two IOFs are 
2
2 / 2f  and 
2 2
1 2( ) / 2f f  respectively. The total surplus created by a 
cooperative is always smaller than the surplus created by two IOFs, i.e. the 
cooperative is inefficient. The behavior of the cooperative CEO is exactly 
the same as the behavior of the CEO of the upstream IOF. Value would be 
created in the cooperative by developing downstream activities because 
1 0cf ! , but the cooperative CEO will not do so because the performance 
measure does not put any weight on them. The difference in value creation 
between the two governance structures is therefore equal to the value 
created at the downstream IOF. This result is summarized in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: A cooperative is inefficient. 
 
Another way to explain the result is that the cooperative is supposed to 
serve member interests and to generate maximum value in processing. 
However, the organizational structures required for the upstream and 
downstream tasks differ. The cooperative is designed for the former task, 
and therefore does not always perform the latter task well. The governance 
structure IOF consists of two separate entities and is tailored to each task 
separately. 
 
2.4 Extensions 
Two extensions are made to address the multiplicity of principals in a 
cooperative (2.4.1) and the endogeneity of the performance measure (2.4.2). 
 
2.4.1 Society of members: size and heterogeneity 
The above model refers to members in general, but no attention has been 
paid to the composition of the society of members. The results can be best 
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understood as the extent to which the CEO’s interest accords with the 
average member’ interest. Now we turn to explore the impact of 
membership size and member heterogeneity on the strength of incentives. 
In the standard principal-agent model, the agent is usually assumed to be 
risk averse whereas the principal is assumed to be risk neutral. The 
assumption that the principal is risk neutral will now be relaxed. Members 
are different from investors of an IOF because the latter are less risk averse 
or diversify their portfolio to spread risks. Due to the immobility of 
cooperative capital, members usually exhibit financial commitment to a 
particular line of business, having all their eggs in one basket (Staatz 1987).  
 
Suppose there are n identical members in the cooperative. The CEO’s 
contribution to member q and to the society of members are 
( ) 1 1 2 2
1 1
qy f a f an n
H   and ( ) 1 1 2 2q
q
y f a f a nH  ¦  respectively. Assuming 
that errors are independent and all members will agree on a single way of 
evaluating the CEO, the performance measure remains 1 1 2 2p g a g a I   . 
Let r denote the CEO’s risk aversion, R the risk aversion of each member, v’ 
the variance of ε, and v the variance of I . It can be shown that the joint risk 
aversion of the members 0R  when they act collusively and pool risks is 
0
1 1
n
n
R R R
  ¦ , i.e. the existence of multiple members decreases members’ 
joint risk aversion. The impact on the efficient bonus rate is 
* 2 2
2
2 ( / )
f gb
g v r R n
   . That is, a larger society of members decreases the 
efficient bonus rate. This is in line with the results in the standard principal-
agent problem regarding risk-aversion. If the agent becomes more risk-
averse, the equilibrium compensation scheme specifies a lower incentive 
intensity and higher base wage. Here it is the increasing ability of a larger 
membership to bear risks which widens the gap with the risk aversion of the 
CEO. 
 
Proposition 2: The managerial incentive intensity decreases with the 
number of members. 
 
Next we relax the assumption of member homogeneity and keep the size of 
the membership fixed. Hansmann (1996) stresses the importance of a 
homogeneous membership for the efficiency of decision-making. However, 
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cooperative members do often not resemble each other in terms of interests. 
They differ in various dimensions, like age, location, size, investment 
portfolio, amount of capital investment, attitude towards risk, and being an 
active or retired member. The result is that members will have different 
preferences regarding the decisions made by the cooperative. For example, 
good performance for the inactive or over-invested member is associated 
with the amount of returned equity, but good performance for the under-
invested or new member means the competitiveness of current prices or 
services (Cook 1994).  
 
The investor and owner role of members entails that they share the same 
goal, that is, bringing the downstream stage of production to value in order 
to receive dividends. As independent farmers, each of them derives 
individual benefits from the cooperative. Suppose n cooperative members 
differ regarding risk aversion and value the CEO’s action 2a  differently. 
The individual benefit of member q is
( ) 1 1 2( ) 2 ( )
1 1
q q qy f a f an n
H   , where 
2( )qf  denotes the value member q assigns to 2a . Consequently the total 
benefits of the society of members is
( ) 1 1 2 2 ( )q q
n n
y f a f a H  ¦ ¦ , where 
2 2( )q
q
f f ¦ . Now the joint risk aversion of the members 0R  becomes
0 ( )
1 1
n qR R
 ¦ , where qR  denotes the risk aversion of member q. The 
efficient bonus rate becomes * 2 22
2 0( )
f gb
g v r R
   . It can be shown that if the 
sum of all members’ risk aversions is fixed, 0R  and subsequently the 
efficient bonus rate is highest when members have identical risk aversions. 
In other words, the heterogeneity of members’ risk aversions leads to lower 
joint risk aversion and consequently a lower efficient bonus rate.  
 
Proposition 3: Increasing heterogeneity in the members’ risk aversions 
decreases the incentive intensity of a cooperative CEO. 
 
This proposition provides an explanation for the phenomenon that, 
compared with investors of an IOF, members of a cooperative usually are 
more homogeneous with regard to their social backgrounds, investment 
portfolios, attitudes towards risk, and so on. This finding suggests that the 
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negative relationship between member heterogeneity and the strength of 
CEO incentives might be one of the considerations regarding the evolution 
of membership heterogeneity in the course of time. The membership may 
be quite heterogeneous at the founding stage of a cooperative, but the 
development of cooperatives are geared towards attracting more 
homogeneous members and encouraging heterogeneous members to leave 
in subsequent stages. This reduces the impact of member heterogeneity on 
the managerial incentive intensity. 
 
2.4.2 Costly performance measure 
So far we have assumed that the performance measurement is determined 
exogenously. Often, however, a principal devotes resources to improve the 
alignment of the performance measure with the CEO’s real contribution. 
Baker (2000, p419) observes that ‘the choice of which performance 
measure to use (and the weights to place on them) depends on how the 
amount of distortion and the amount of risk change as one moves from one 
performance measure to another’. We endogenize the choice of 
performance measure by assuming that incorporating an additional 
performance measure is costly. 
 
Take subjective evaluation as an example. The board of a cooperative may 
develop a performance assessment and flexibly evaluate the CEO’s 
contribution in various dimensions. The design and implementation of this 
new measure will consume money, time and effort of the personnel 
department. The misalignment between performance measure and 
production function is captured by θ, i.e. a smaller θ represents better 
alignment. Assume that the cost of improving alignment in governance 
structure i is ci(Δθi), where Δθi is defined as the reduction in misalignment 
in governance structure i. More reduction in misalignment is more costly, 
i.e. the first order derivative of ci is positive. It is of course not possible to 
reduce the misalignment by more than θ. This is captured by defining 
( )i ic T'  f  when Δθi >θ. 
 
Section 3 has specified the relationship between the incentive intensity and 
the alignment between f and g. That is, the reaction function b*(θ) states the 
optimal bonus rate b as a function of alignment θ. By including the cost of 
alignment, we are able to indentify alignment as a function of the incentive 
intensity. The reaction function θ*(b) is determined by maximizing the 
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expected total surplus  ( ) [ ( ) ( )]i i i i i i iE U E y c a cS T    '  with respect to 
Δθi. In an equilibrium incentive system, the amount of alignment and 
incentive intensity are determined together by the intersection of the two 
reaction functions b*(θ) and θ*(b), i.e. the point where the bonus rate is 
chosen optimally for the given alignment and the alignment is selected 
optimally for the given bonus rate.  
 
The implications of the equilibrium incentive system are favorable for a 
cooperative. Consider first the IOF. The inclusion of alignment cost has no 
impact because there is no scope for reducing misalignment in an IOF due 
to the production function and performance measure being already perfectly 
aligned, i.e. ( )i ic T'  f  when Δθi > θ=0. For a cooperative, the 
equilibrium incentive system cannot be inferior to the old equilibrium 
because maintaining the old equilibrium is always an option. There are two 
cases to consider. First, the benefit of improving alignment exceeds the cost 
of doing so. It is then beneficial for the cooperative to improve the 
alignment of the performance measure. Thus, the cooperative gains and 
total surplus is increased. Second, the benefit of improving alignment does 
not cover the cost of doing so. The cooperative will choose not to improve 
alignment and the old equilibrium results are maintained. In short, a 
cooperative can never be worse off if the cost of alignment is taken into 
account. 
 
2.5 Additional information 
Cooperatives lack an important source of information due to the absence of 
a stock listing. However, they may include other information in the 
performance measure in order to direct some attention of the CEO to 
valuable downstream activities. We capture the additional information by 
introducing a third activity in the model. The production function becomes 
1 1 2 2 3 3i i i i i i iy f a f a f a H    , the performance measure takes the form 
1 1 2 2 3 3g a g a g ai i i i i i ip I    , and the cost of actions is 
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( ) / 2i i i i i i ic a a a a a a   . We show in the current section that 
additional information in the performance measure makes the cooperative 
uniquely efficient in certain circumstances. We consider public versus 
accounting data (2.5.1) and subjective performance measurement (2.5.2). 
 
2.5.1 Public versus accounting data 
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Next to the public listing, there are usually many other sources of 
information revealing the performance of a firm. We will highlight the 
informativeness of accounting data regarding the short-term impact of the 
downstream activities. Accounting measures have advantages as well as 
disadvantages compared to stock prices. One might argue when accounting 
measures are used, temporary losses might be allowed to establish 
sustainable future gains, as the lack of a stock listing makes temporary 
losses less visible (Hendrikse & Veerman 2001b). However, accounting 
measures are often criticized for inducing costly myopic behavior. 
Managers can use the possibility for manipulation provided by the latitude 
in accounting principles to maximize compensation (Libby, Bloomfield & 
Nelson 2002), since myopic actions taken to enhance current accounting 
performance are not easily detected. At the same time, the cautious nature 
of accounting rules which do not recognize uncertain gains and, in the U.S., 
require R&D investments to be fully expensed immediately, is also argued 
to cause myopia (Bushee 1998). For instance, the durable impact of 
continued training on firm performance is not recognized as an asset by the 
accounting representation, and only current revenues will pay it off. That is, 
training expenditure will be matched immediately against them. Cook 
(1995) claims in the context of cooperatives, that the horizon problem 
pushes the management to accelerate members’ short-term benefits at the 
expense of long-term earnings. Despite these shortcomings, accounting 
measures are not completely uninformative.  
 
We decompose 1ia  into two actions, ila  and isa , each denoting the CEO’s 
action to boost long-term and short-term firm value. The marginal product 
and performance measure parameters of actions are respectively ilf  and isf , 
ilg and isg . Table 2 shows the distinctions between cooperatives with and 
without accounting measures in their CEO compensation schemes, where C’ 
stands for a cooperative using accounting measures to evaluate its CEO. It 
illustrates that a publicly listed firm can use both long-term and short-term 
incentives; a cooperative using accounting data gives its CEO only short-
term incentives regarding the cooperative firm. To conduct a fair 
comparison on the efficiency of the two governance structures, suppose 
there is an upstream IOF producer next to the downstream IOF processor 
which is concerned merely with the value created at upstream stage. We 
denote the upstream and downstream IOF as FU and FD. 
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i  FU FD C C’ 
ilf  0 >0 >0 >0 
isf  0 >0 >0 >0 
2if  >0 0 >0 >0 
ilg  0 >0 0 0 
isg  0 >0 0 >0 
2ig  >0 0 >0 >0 
 
Table 2: The production function and performance measure differences 
between the IOFs and the cooperatives 
 
It is straightforward that ' 0C sa ! and 2 ' 0Ca ! . The use of accounting data 
helps at least motivate the cooperative CEO to pay attention to the 
downstream enterprise, though it is likely to overly accentuate the short-run 
activities, ignoring the long-run interests. By including accounting 
measures, the performance measure is better aligned with the production 
function, and the CEO has incentives to advance both the value of upstream 
member farms and the short-run goals of the cooperative firm.  
 
Next we compare the total surpluses of the two IOFs to the total surplus of 
a cooperative. Denote the surplus of the upstream IOF, the downstream IOF 
and the cooperative as SU, SD and SC. It can be shown that 22 / 2US f ˈ
2 2 2( ) / 2( )D s s l l s lS f g f g g g    and 2 2 22 2 2( ) / 2( )C s s sS f g f g g g   . Notice 
that SD increases with lg  when /l l s sg f g f , reaches its maximum at 
/l l s sg f g f , and decreases with lg  when /l l s sg f g f! . Notice also that 
/l l s sg f g f 
 
can be rewritten as / /l s l sg g f f . It entails perfect 
alignment.  SD is therefore maximized when there is perfect alignment. 
When 0lg  , SU+SD≥SC. When 0 /l l s sg f g f  , SD, and consequently 
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g 
SU+SD, increases with lg , which implies that SU+SD>SC holds in this 
interval. Define θD as the angle between the f and g vectors when only the 
downstream activities are taken into account. Figure 3 depicts the 
parameters of the performance measure and the production function 
regarding the downstream activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 3: Alignment in the downstream IOF 
 
Given that SD decreases with lg  when /l l s sg f g f! , we want to know the 
conditions when the cooperative is the unique efficient governance 
structure. An example of SU+SD>SC is 2 2 1, 2l s sf f g g f      and 
(4 21) / 5lg !  . It indicates that there has to be at least a lower bound on 
lg  in order for the cooperative to be efficient. This ensures that θD in figure 
3 is above a certain level. In other words, the cooperative is more likely to 
be efficient when a high weight is attached in the performance measure to 
the stock price, as compared to the weight to the accounting data. However, 
this is not a sufficient condition. The production function parameters have 
also to be taken into account. Notice that the attractiveness of the 
cooperative also increases when the value of the downstream activities not 
reflected in the stock price increases in importance, i.e. sf increases. An 
increase in sf  is equivalent to a decrease in lf . This increases θD even 
sf  Coefficient on sa  
Coefficient on la  
θD 
lg
f 
lf
sg
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further and may make the cooperative the unique efficient governance 
structure. Proposition 4 makes this claim precise. It states that the 
cooperative is the unique efficient governance structure when the weight 
regarding the activity determining the public listing is sufficiently large and 
the marginal product related to this activity is sufficiently low. 
 
Proposition 4: If 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
2s s s s s
l
s
f g f g f g f gf
g g
   , then the cooperative is the 
unique efficient governance structure when gl is sufficiently large. 
 
A large value of lg  provides strong incentives to develop activities 
increasing the value of the public listing, but this is reduced to a normal 
level of activity due to the scale effect in the efficient incentive intensity. 
However, this scale effect reduces also the incentive intensity regarding the 
other downstream activity by the IOF drastically. This imbalance may 
reduce SU+SD to such an extent that it drops below SC. This result indicates 
that, not having a public listing provides the cooperative with a 
commitment to dedicate sufficient attention to valuable downstream 
activities that are not captured in the stock price as a performance measure. 
Proposition 4 specifies the circumstances when the misalignment in the 
downstream IOF is sufficiently large to make the cooperative the unique 
efficient governance structure. The angle θD is sufficiently large when f is 
sufficiently flat, i.e. lf  is below a certain level and g is sufficiently steep, 
i.e. lg  is above a certain level. 
 
2.5.2 Subjective performance assessment  
Objective performance measures have been highlighted to evaluate the 
CEO’s contribution to the firm. However, they are typically not sufficient 
to create ideal incentives (Gibbons 1998). The stock price, for example, 
involves too much noise and external influences that are beyond the CEO’s 
control. The uncertainty of agriculture in particular ‘hampers tying a bonus 
to easily measured performance indicators that a CEO can control and that 
are of value of the cooperative’ (Trechter et al. 1997). Moreover, paying the 
management for the current earnings sometimes goes at the expense of 
long-term profits. Activities that do not create immediate short-term profits 
though redound to long-term development, like R&D, might be 
underinvested.  
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In multi-task settings, it is often helpful to use multiple instruments to 
provide a balanced package of incentives. For instance, many firms 
mitigate the effects of distortionary objective performance measures by 
augmenting objective measures with subjective performance assessments 
even where the objective aspects of an individual’s contribution to firm 
value are easily measured. Subjective measures refer to a judgment by the 
supervisor of the subordinates’ performance, including a judgment of the 
actions taken to achieve that performance. Subjective evaluations can take 
different forms, such as (1) flexible weighting of objective performance 
measures ex-post (at the end of the evaluation period); (2) the use of 
subjective (qualitative) measures; (3) discretion in using additional 
performance criteria (Ittner 2003). They are more useful when decisions 
affect results further in the future (Lambert & Larcker 1987). Subjectivity 
allows the supervisor to correct for dysfunctional behavior, such as myopia, 
induced by incomplete performance measures (Gibbons 1998). Empirical 
evidence shows that when subjective evaluation is used more extensively, 
CEO compensation is more positively related to future earnings (Hayes & 
Schaefer 2000). Furthermore, the use of subjectivity in evaluations has been 
found to increase with firm growth opportunities and product life cycle 
length (Bushman, Indjejikian & Smith 1996).  
 
Cooperatives may use subjective performance assessments to reconcile the 
short-term orientation and motivate managers to undertake actions with 
longer-term focus and consequences. That is, the performance of the CEO 
should be subjectively assessed by the board of directors who are well 
placed to observe the subtleties of the CEO’s behavior and opportunities. 
The geographic proximity of patrons to their firm may also create stronger 
social ties between management and owners. The fact that the patrons are in 
a privileged position to observe and monitor managerial operations and the 
stable long-run relationships between owners and the board, suggests 
greater reliance on subjective performance evaluation in cooperatives 
(Hueth & Marcoul 2008). As discussed earlier, the board of directors in 
cooperatives is significantly more independent than its IOF counterpart is, 
and is better motivated to monitor the CEO. They interact with 
management both in the boardroom, and as patrons, they potentially have 
more information about the production environment in which the CEO 
operates. In addition, the patrons’ vested interests in the performance of the 
cooperative and its CEO may reduce agency problems. Because the patrons 
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are also the owners, virtually every transaction in the cooperative involves a 
principal who can oversee the agent’s actions. Therefore, the patrons’ 
feedback and general level of satisfaction can also be part of the subjective 
assessment (Trechter et al. 1997). As a result, ‘the incentive and 
compensation system encourages good long-run performance and is not 
driven by favorable or unfavorable short-run fluctuations’ (Trechter et al. 
1997). 
 
We provide no formal modeling regarding subjective performance 
assessment in this section because it is similar to modeling the impact of 
incorporating accounting data. The only difference is that the labels 
regarding short and long run have to be reversed. However, the impact on 
alignment is the same. Incorporating subjective performance assessments 
will improve alignment, and therefore the managerial incentives.   
 
2.6 Conclusions and further research 
Why should we expect differences in the performance of cooperatives and 
publicly listed firms? We propose that the answer does not reside in the 
character or abilities of the management but in the constraints and the 
opportunities of the governance structure with which that management is 
faced. A model is presented highlighting the principal-agent tension 
between members and the cooperative CEO. Results are generated 
regarding the sensitivity of the optimal incentive intensity to the 
membership composition and to the composition of performance measure. 
The alignment between the performance measure and the production 
function is emphasized. While regulators and shareholders of an IOF may 
find it beneficial to encourage the use of equity-based compensation 
(Bebchuk & Fried 2003), a pay package that is very sensitive to any single 
performance measure will bring about misalignment and inefficiency in 
cooperatives. The lack of public listing in cooperatives may actually result 
in the cooperative being the unique efficient governance structure. 
 
As far as we know, this article is the first to model the absence of a public 
listing as an advantage for cooperatives. However, much more is to be done. 
First, various behavioral implications may be formulated in terms of growth, 
innovation, and diversification. Holmström (1999) predicts higher growth 
for IOFs due to growth being the single most important determinant of 
stock price. The IOF CEO has therefore strong incentives to pursue growth, 
whereas a stock price is lacking in cooperatives. Thirkell (1989, p14) 
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claims that cooperatives are generally not innovative or progressive. Given 
the discussion in previous sections, the emphasis of a cooperative on 
upstream member benefits entails that the process innovation in members’ 
close interests is not necessarily ineffective or inactive as compared with 
that in an IOF. Furthermore, the fact that members have expertise and will 
bring new ideas about their products will strengthen the cooperative’s 
search for product related differentiation. Diversification choices of an IOF 
aim to maximize the net returns of the investors, while the diversification 
choices of a cooperative are guided by bringing to value the portfolio of 
members. Caves and Petersen (1986) argue that cooperative organizations 
are ill-suited to entrepreneurial tasks that involve activities far removed 
from the direct interests and experience of the cooperative members. In 
other words, its possibilities for diversification are limited. A cooperative 
focuses more on searching markets for sale instead of searching for market 
opportunities. We expect therefore that cooperatives are less diversified 
than IOFs. 
 
Second, Trechter et al. (1997) is right that the CEO is important for the 
success of a cooperative. However, enterprises have a variety of means to 
address coordination and motivation problems, of which CEO performance 
measure is one. Other instruments have therefore to be considered in 
combination with it. For example, further research may incorporate the 
internal control mechanism in cooperatives. The board of directors is 
usually elected by and from the membership, and is commonly representing 
member interests. They have more access to information inside the 
organization and have more at stake in the cooperative than their 
counterparts in IOFs have, and are thus expected to be a more active 
monitor and participant. 
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Chapter 3 
Chain Interdependencies and Efficient Governance 
Structure: Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms 
 
These figures suggest that cooperatives tend to operate in the low value-
added, first-stage food manufacturing industries. 
Cook 1995, p1154 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Some researchers doubt the efficiency of cooperatives and argue that 
cooperatives suffer from a host of problems unique to this specific form of 
governance. Stewart (1993) even asserts that a business cannot be 
successfully run if its customers or suppliers are deeply involved in running 
it because there is too much conflict of interest. Yet, cooperatives and IOFs 
coexist in many sectors of most modern economies and compete for market 
share, especially in the agricultural sector where cooperatives have played 
an active role for a very long time in many countries (Hansmann 1996).  
 
A cooperative is an enterprise collectively owned by many independent 
farmers as input suppliers in a production chain. The members own 
collectively a joint resource where they either further process or market 
their produce. They delegate certain rights to the cooperative enterprise. 
Subsequently, the cooperative enterprise concludes contracts with members, 
specifying for example delivery requirements. The vertical ties between the 
members and the processor therefore consist of a transaction element and 
an ownership element. An IOF processor is a firm owned by outside 
investors and it has merely a transactional relationship with its input 
suppliers. 
 
An important agent in bringing an enterprise to value is the CEO (Chief 
Executive Officer). This is reflected in the massive amount of research 
focusing on what guides CEO behavior (see for example Babchuk & Fried 
2003). An important part of the research attention is executive 
compensation because it can help in rectifying the agency problem between 
the CEO and the owner(s). The relationship between the principal and the 
agent differs between a cooperative and an IOF. The situation in 
cooperatives is most likely more complex than a standard principal-agent 
relationship in an IOF. First, the tasks of a cooperative CEO consist of more 
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dimensions due to the ‘cooperative’s goal of jointly maximizing member 
and cooperative returns’ (Peterson & Anderson 1996, p376). Members are 
users in addition to owners of the firm. They have at least two sets of 
concerns: owner concerns and user concerns. Owner concerns revolve 
around the security and overall profitability of their investments in the 
cooperative. User concerns include issues of the pricing and quality of 
product and services, which influence the profitability of their individual 
farm enterprise (Staatz 1987). These two concerns are reflected in the 
members’ expectation regarding the management.  
 
Second, the incentive contract of a CEO is based on a performance 
measurement system, creating incentives that align the goal of the agent 
with that of the organization. However, there are no simple indicators of 
cooperative managerial performance or automatic incentive systems (such 
as stock options) to close the gap in interests. Giving a CEO equity in the 
business, a common way to tie the CEO’s wealth to firm performance and 
thus to alleviate the interests conflict in IOFs, is not feasible in cooperatives. 
The reason is that a cooperative CEO is not eligible to hold equity in the 
business and receives only limited benefits from such ownership given the 
fact that most cooperative stock does not appreciate in value (Trechter et al. 
1997). Given these additional complexities in cooperatives, designing a 
contract ensuring the mutual compatibility of a cooperative’s goals and the 
CEO’s incentives has to be even more difficult.  
 
These observations inspire the following questions: What is the impact of 
the special features of the governance structures cooperative and IOF on the 
behavior of the CEO? When is a cooperative (with its member ownership 
and its lack of public listing) uniquely efficient? These questions will be 
addressed by incorporating the above distinctions between cooperatives and 
IOFs in a multi-task principal-agent model. We specify an upstream and a 
downstream activity, their interdependency, and a performance measure for 
the CEO capturing the difference in public listing between the two 
governance structures. This allows us to determine the circumstances when 
a cooperative is the unique efficient governance structure.9 
 
                                                 
9 This article is not the first to identify these circumstances. We like to mention 
Bontems & Fulton (2009), Hendrikse (1998), Hendrikse & Veerman (2001a, 
2001b), and Sexton (1986).  
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We position our article in six ways. First, most studies regarding contract 
choice in agrarian economics using the principal-agent model are geared to 
the relationship between a landowner and a farmer (Hayami & Otsuka 
1993). We address the relationship between farmers and the CEO of a 
cooperative. Second, Fulton and Hueth (2009) indicate that cooperative 
conversions, failures, and restructurings are often due to poor management, 
next to lack of capital, property rights problems and portfolio problems. 
They observe regarding cases ‘that were identified as having poor 
management were also identified as having significant agency problems’. 
This article addresses on the one hand these agency problems by analyzing 
the impact of the performance measurement scheme on managerial 
performance, and on the other hand identifies the sectors in which 
cooperatives are most likely to be successful.  A third way to position the 
article is that a variety of corporate forms has to be considered when 
studying the nature of the firm (Hansmann 1996). A cooperative is from 
this perspective an informative counterfactual for the much studied 
publicly-listed corporation. To be more specific, a cooperative has various 
special features which distinguish it from other governance structures. One 
of the objectives of research regarding cooperatives is to show that these 
features may actually be desirable, despite the widespread belief that they 
are not. In this article we demonstrate that the absence of a public listing, 
often believed as a disadvantage of cooperatives, can make a cooperative 
uniquely efficient. Finally, issues regarding the governance of enterprises 
are often distinguished into income and decision rights (Hansmann 1996). 
Income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs allocated?’ 
i.e. they specify the rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to pay the 
costs, that are associated with the use of an asset. Decision rights in the 
form of authority and responsibility address the question ‘Who has 
authority or control?’ i.e. they concern all rights and rules regarding the 
deployment and use of assets. This article is about income rights, whereas 
Hendrikse & Veerman (2001a, 2001b) are about decision rights. It entails 
implicitly that the ownership role is subordinate to the user/patron role in 
this article. 
 
The next section presents the model. Section 3.3 identifies the efficient 
governance structure. The strategic choice of performance measure is 
addressed in section 3.4. Conclusions and research directions are 
formulated in the final section. 
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3.2 Model 
A multi-task principal-agent model (Gibbons 1998) is developed to capture 
governance structure differences between cooperatives and IOFs. The 
model consists of a two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, the 
principal (i.e. the owner) chooses the strength of incentives while the agent 
(i.e., the CEO)’s optimal choice of activities is determined in the second 
stage of the game. Assume that the CEO in governance structure i (c for a 
cooperative and f for an IOF) can take two actions. First, denote 1ia  as the 
CEO’s action to advance the value of the downstream firm. For example, a 
CEO’s tasks include setting long-term goals, establishing policies and 
standards, determining long-term financing needs and sources, and setting 
strategies (Blanchard et al. 1996). According to Merchant (1990), CEOs 
allocates their time over eight categories of activities: 1) new product 
development, 2) improvement of existing products/services, 3) 
adjusting/improving production processes, 4) employee development, 5) 
capacity expansion, 6) improvement of information systems, 7) execution 
of current production processes, and 8) advertising and sales promotion.  
 
Second, denote 2ia  as the action adding value to the upstream suppliers. In 
addition to the activities mentioned above, a cooperative CEO needs to take 
actions that create value for the upstream members because of the user-
owner feature of cooperatives. Three extra categories are specified. The 
first category is improvement of member involvement and member loyalty. 
Compared with his IOF counterpart, the cooperative CEO is more 
interdependent and interactive when coping with the user-owners. As a 
leader of a community-based organization, he needs to be particularly 
effective in fostering group cohesiveness, a key component in improving 
member loyalty. The second category is vertical information exchange. A 
cooperative CEO once informed us that he spent at least half of his time 
communicating with member patrons. Members have different preferences 
as to price, cost allocation, and equity retirement polices, which affect both 
the cooperative and the member enterprises. They have more formal and 
informal channels to communicate their desires to the CEO than do patrons 
of an IOF and thus are able to exercise cheaper “voice” (Staatz 1987). 
Meanwhile, a cooperative CEO must actively acquire useful information in 
discovering the optimal choice (Cook 1994). The third category is member 
coordination and improvement of member relations. A cooperative CEO 
takes a more integrated view of the members’ fixed costs when attempting 
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to optimize the vaguely defined objective function of the firm. The more 
heterogeneous the membership, the more will be the difficulty for the CEO 
to form consensus and viable internal coalitions. The CEOs, particularly 
those of large, diversified cooperatives, need to spend considerable time 
and effort in negotiating and meeting the expectation of members. They are 
required to reduce the increasingly heterogeneous interests to more 
homogeneous interests to capture the benefits of coordination (Cook 1994). 
 
The CEO’s total contribution to firm value is denoted by iy . Denote the 
marginal product of action jia by jif . The production function is 
1 1 2 2i i i i iy f a f a H   , where H is a stochastic variable with expected value 
of zero, representing the noise in the production process that is beyond the 
agent’s control. Given the difficulty in measuring the exact overall effect of 
the CEO’s actions on firm value, no compensation contract based on iy  can 
be enforced in court. Therefore, an alternative performance measure ip  
becomes necessary. Suppose the technology of performance measurement 
takes the form 1 1 2 2g a g ai i i i ip I   , where jig  denotes the performance 
measurement parameter, i.e., the weight attached to jia , and I  denotes the 
noise in performance measurement with expected value of zero. Suppose 
the compensation contract in governance structure i specifies the wage iw  
paid to the CEO as a linear function of ip , i.e. i i i iw s b p  , where is  
stands for the salary and ib  for the bonus rate. The principal’s payoff is the 
difference between the CEO’s total contribution to firm value and the wage 
paid: i i iy wS   . The CEO’s payoff is the difference between the wage 
received and the cost of the actions taken: 1 2( , )i i i i iU w c a a  . Assume that 
the cost function takes the form 
2 2
1 2
1 2 1 2( , ) 2 2
i i
i i i i i
a ac a a ka a   , where -
1<k<1 (Dixit 2002). The parameter k captures interdependencies between 
the upstream and downstream activities in the production chain. There are 
no interdependencies when k=0. When 0<k<1, the two tasks are substitutes, 
i.e., more effort in 1ia  increases the marginal cost of effort in 2ia , therefore 
enhancing the marginal incentive payment for greater output of 1ia , 
drawing effort away from 2ia . Examples of substitutable tasks are the time 
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spent in communicating with the input suppliers and the time spent on the 
business strategies of the firm. When the workload of the CEO is fixed, the 
more he works with the suppliers, the less time is left to spend on the 
strategies. When -1<k<0, the two tasks are complements, implying that the 
interaction between the two tasks strengthens incentives for both. An 
example of complementary tasks is the CEO’s coordination role between 
the suppliers and the enterprise. Well known is the matching problem 
regarding sugar beets between the delivery of each farmer’s harvest and the 
capacity of the processing plant. A farmer likes to deliver his harvest 
immediately to the processor, while the processor likes to spread the 
deliveries in order to reduce the idleness of the plant. More knowledge of 
one side facilitates coordination with the other side. 
 
Differences between a cooperative and an IOF are formulated in terms of 
restrictions on the parameters in the production function and the 
performance measure. First, the CEO’s contribution to firm value depends 
on the organizational form. In cooperatives, it is equivalent to the change in 
total member value. Members want to bring both upstream farms and the 
downstream cooperative to value, i.e., 1 20, 0c cf f! ! . Investors in a 
downstream IOF care only about the value of the firm and consequently the 
CEO’s action that increases firm value, i.e., 1 20, 0f ff f!  . Second, the 
performance measures of IOFs and cooperatives differ. It is not unusual in 
IOFs that the CEO’s bonus is paid in the form of firm shares, i.e., 1 0fg ! . 
Additionally, the CEO of an IOF at the downstream stage of production 
will of course not be rewarded based on a performance measure taking 
upstream activities into account, i.e. 2 0fg  . Cooperatives lack a public 
listing. They are therefore not able to pay the CEO with shares reflecting 
the value of the downstream enterprise. We capture this observation by 
1 0cg  .10 However, member interests are usually present in the incentive 
scheme for the CEO of a cooperative, e.g. by benchmarking the transfer 
price and production volume. This is reflected in our assumption that 
2 0cg ! . Notice that these assumptions regarding the parameters in the 
performance measure scheme of the cooperative reflects that members are 
                                                 
10 We are not stating that a cooperative has no information at all about the 
downstream activities, but our model will focus on the impact of lacking certain 
information. 
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i
prioritized rather than the downstream activities, which is of course popular 
with members, especially those who are close to retirement. 
 
To summarize, members’ plurality of interests is represented by 2 0cf ! , 
while the absence of patron-members, and therefore serving their interests, 
in an IOF is represented by 2 0fg  .  The absence of public listing of a 
cooperative is embodied by 1 0cg  , while the use of stock price in an 
IOF’s performance measure is captured by 1 0fg ! . The distinct features of 
both governance structures are displayed in table 1. 
 
 f c 
1if  >0 >0 
2if  0 >0 
1ig  >0 0 
2ig  0 >0 
 
Table 1: Marginal product and performance measure parameters  
of different governance structures 
 
3.3 Efficient governance structure 
We use backward induction to solve the game. We start therefore in the 
second stage of the game in order to determine * ( )ji ka , i.e. the equilibrium 
level of task j in governance structure i when the interdependencies 
between tasks in the cost function is k. Subsequently we determine in stage 
one the equilibrium bonus rate *( )i kb . 
 
The CEO’s optimal action is determined by maximizing his expected utility, 
i.e.,
1 2 3, ,
max ( )
i i i
ia a a
E U , where 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) [ ( , )] (g a g a ) ( , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE U E w c a a s b c a a      .  
Setting the first derivative of the expected utility function with respect to 
jia  equal to zero results in the first order condition /i ji i jib g c a w w , 1,2j  . 
This characterizes the CEO’s optimal actions * ( )ji ia b . 
 
54 
 
The payoff-maximizing reply in the second stage of the game is anticipated 
in the first stage when the principal chooses *( )i kb . 
*
( )i kb  is determined by 
maximizing the expected total surplus, that is, 
( )
max ( )
i k
i ib
E US  ,  where  
* * * *
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) [ ( , )] ( , )i i i i i i i i i i i i iE U E y c a a f a f a c a aS       . 
 
The efficient bonus rates for a firm and a cooperative are * ( ) 1 1/f k f fb f g  
and *( ) 2 1 2( ) /c k c c cb f kf g  . Plugging these results in the expressions for the 
CEO’s equilibrium actions results in * 21 ( ) 2 1( ) / (1 )c k c ca k f kf k    , 
* 2
2 ( ) 2 1( ) / (1 )c k c ca f kf k   . Notice that the CEO in a cooperative will not 
choose *1 0ca  , despite that the performance measurement scheme of the 
cooperative prioritizes the members rather than the downstream activities, 
i.e. 1 0cg   and 2 0cg ! . It will differ from 0 because doing so is attractive 
in order to benefit from the chain interdependencies. Similarly, the 
equilibrium results for a downstream IOF CEO are * 21 ( ) 1 / (1 )f k fa f k  , 
* 2
2 ( ) 1 / (1 )f k fa kf k   . The equilibrium results for an upstream IOF, with 
1 2 1 20, 0, 0, 0f f f ff f g g !  !  are * 2 2/ufb f g , * 21 2 / (1 )ufa kf k   , and 
* 2
2 2 / (1 )ufa f k  . 
 
3.3.1 No interdependency, i.e. k=0 
If k=0, then the efficient bonus rates of an IOF and a cooperative are 
therefore * 1 1/f f fb f g , * 2 2/c c cb f g . Plugging these results in the 
expressions for the CEO’s equilibrium actions results in *1 1( )f f fa b f , 
*
2 0fa   and *1 0ca  , *2 2( )c c ca b f . 
 
A cooperative and an IOF differ because f and g are not aligned in a 
cooperative, whereas they are in an IOF. The misalignment is due to the 
production function depending on two actions while the performance 
measure in a cooperative is determined by only one of them. The 
appearance of 1ca  in the production function does not have any impact on 
the efficient bonus rate and subsequently on the CEO’s equilibrium actions 
because it is not acknowledged in the performance measure. When an 
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action increases the member value without simultaneously increasing the 
performance measure, the CEO has no incentives to undertake it. 
 
In equilibrium, an IOF CEO has incentives to undertake only 1 fa , because 
the investors care only about 1 fa   and make the CEO’s pay dependent only 
on 1 fa . Members of cooperatives, however, appreciate the CEO’s actions 
on both dimensions but only compensate for 2ca . Thus, only an incentive to 
increase 2ca  is created and no incentive for 1ca  exists even though it would 
increase firm value. The misalignment between member value and the 
cooperative CEO’s interest results in the CEO’s failure to add value to the 
downstream enterprise, while the perfect interest alignment between the 
investors and the IOF CEO creates an incentive for the CEO to advance the 
firm value. 
 
To facilitate the comparison of the governance structures cooperative and 
IOF in terms of efficiency, we assume that the marginal product and the 
performance measurement parameter of each activity remain the same 
across different governance structures. For example, 1f  and 1g  for 1a  for a 
cooperative, an upstream and a downstream IOF. Therefore the above 
results become * 1 1/fb f g , * 2 2/cb f g , *1 1fa f , *2 0fa  , *1 0ca  , 
*
2 2ca f . Similarly, the equilibrium results for an upstream IOF are 
*
2 2/ufb f g , *1 0ufa  , and *2 2ufa f . 
 
A fair comparison of the efficiency of the two governance structures entails 
comparing the value created by a cooperative with the joint value created 
by a downstream and an upstream IOF. Straightforward calculations show 
that the total surplus of a cooperative and two IOFs are 22 / 2f  and 
2 2
1 2( ) / 2f f  respectively. The total surplus created by a cooperative is 
always less than the surplus created by the two IOFs when 1 0f ! , i.e. the 
cooperative is inefficient. The behavior of the cooperative CEO is exactly 
the same as the behavior of the CEO of the upstream IOF. Value would be 
created in the cooperative by developing downstream activities because 
1 0cf ! , but the cooperative CEO will not choose these activities because 
the performance measure does not put any weight on them. The difference 
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in value creation between the two governance structures is therefore equal 
to the value created at the downstream IOF. This result is summarized in 
proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: A cooperative is inefficient when k=0. 
 
Another way to explain this result is that the cooperative is supposed to 
serve member interests and to generate maximum value in processing. 
However, the organizational structures required for the upstream and 
downstream tasks differ. The cooperative is designed for the former task, 
and therefore does not always perform the latter task well. The governance 
structure IOF consists of two separate entities, i.e. a downstream and an 
upstream IOF. It is tailored to each task separately. Section 3.2 will show 
that this result hinges on the assumption that the upstream and downstream 
activities are independent.  
 
3.3.2 Substitutable / complementary tasks, i.e. 0<k<1 / -1<k<0 
The main result with either substitute or complementary tasks is that 2 fa  
and 1ca  are not zero anymore in equilibrium. Their actual levels will 
depend on the nature and the strength of the interaction effects. The 
marginal cost of 1 fa decreases with the level of 2 fa in the complementary 
case and increases in the substitute case. If 2 fa  can make 1 fa  less costly, 
the CEO will optimally choose to take some actions 2 fa , which will further 
increase *1 ( )f ka  as compared with 
*
1 (0)fa . The stronger is the complementary 
effect, the more actions will be taken on 2 fa . If 2 fa  makes 1 fa  more costly, 
he will take a negative action on 2 fa  since it will decrease the marginal 
cost of action 1 fa . As a result of the decreased marginal cost, 
*
1 ( )f ka  
increases. The CEO’s action advancing the downstream value increases, i.e., 
* *
1 ( ) 1 (0)f k fa a! , regardless the nature of the interaction between tasks. 
 
When k=0, a cooperative CEO will in equilibrium take no action to increase 
the downstream enterprise’s value. However, if two actions are 
complementary, he will optimally choose to take action on 1ca , which in 
turn increases the equilibrium level of 2 ( )c ka  as compared with 
*
2 (0)ca . A 
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stronger complementary effect results in higher levels of *1 ( )c ka  and 
*
2 ( )c ka . 
A high bonus rate leads to a high level of *2 ( )c ka , which will result in a 
higher *1 ( )c ka  due to the complementary effect. Therefore, a principal 
valuing both actions has incentives to increase the bonus rate in order to 
increase both actions. The stronger is the complementary effect, the larger 
is the efficient bonus rate. When the two tasks are substitutes, a high bonus 
rate drives the CEO to exert as much effort as possible to 2ca  while taking 
no action or even negative action on 1ca . Therefore, the principal will cut 
down the bonus rate. The stronger is the substituting effect, the smaller is 
the efficient bonus rate.  
 
Interactions between the downstream and upstream activities may make the 
cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. These interactions in 
the cost function elicit new activities by the CEOs, i.e., the cooperative 
CEO will choose a positive level of the downstream activities, downstream 
activities are chosen also by the CEO at the upstream IOF, and upstream 
activities are put forward by the CEO at the downstream IOF. It turns out 
that the equilibrium level of upstream activities generated by the 
cooperative is identical to the level of upstream activities by the two IOFs 
together, while the level of downstream activities generated by the 
cooperative is lower than the level of downstream activities by the two 
IOFs together. Total output in a cooperative is therefore lower than in the 
IOFs. However, the decrease in total costs in a cooperative is even larger 
when the complementarities are sufficiently strong. The reason is that the 
decrease in the downstream activities by the cooperative CEO is limited 
due to 1 0cf ! . This makes the cooperative the unique efficient governance 
structure, despite that the downstream activities are not recognized in the 
CEO’ compensation scheme. The cooperative internalizes externalities to a 
certain extent by putting positive weight on serving member interests and 
generating maximum value in processing. Not having a public listing 
provides the cooperative with a commitment not to choose the level of the 
downstream activities too high. This result is formulated in proposition 2. 
(The cooperative is never efficient when the downstream and upstream 
activities are substitutes or independent.) 
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Proposition 2: A cooperative is uniquely efficient if and only if 
1 22
2
1
kf f
k
  . 
 
This result provides at least two indications where cooperatives are to be 
expected. First, cooperatives are expected in sectors where the marginal 
productivity at the downstream stage is below a certain level, which 
depends on the strength of the complementarities and the marginal 
productivity at the upstream stage of production. This is in line with the 
opening citation of this article. Second, the incidence of cooperatives varies 
between countries and over time. Hansmann (1999, p387) observes that 
‘more generally and more strikingly, the overall share of economic activity 
accounted for by cooperatives is larger in advanced economies than it is in 
less-developed economies. And, more striking still, the market share of 
cooperatives in economic activity has grown throughout the 20th century.’ 
One development in the advanced economies is the rise of ICT, and its 
applications in the management of supply chains. Improving the 
coordination in supply chains entails an increase in the importance of chain 
complementarities, i.e. a decrease in the level of the chain 
interdependencies parameter k in our model. The above inequality indicates 
that cooperatives are the efficient organizational form in more sectors of the 
economy when the strength of chain complementarities increases. 
 
3.4 Strategic choice of performance measure 
This section argues that there may be a strategic rationale involved in the 
choice of the performance measure parameters. Strategic as well as 
efficiency considerations may determine the weights in the performance 
measure to establish alignment with the production function parameters. An 
early contribution is Vickers (1985). Notice that to study strategic 
performance measurement choice, there need to be (potential) competition 
between enterprises, i.e., there have to be at least two enterprises. 
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Figure 1: Performance measure choice and reaction functions 
 
According to Fudenberg & Tirole (1984), three variables have to be 
specified in order to determine the payoff maximizing choice of 
performance measure in a strategic setting: the nature of the investment, the 
nature of the competitive process, and the entry condition. First, define the 
investment as the extent of member focus in the performance measure. If 
the extent of member focus is large, i.e., 2g  is much higher than 1g , then 
the profits of the rival firm will increase. The reason is that the CEO will 
dedicate a larger part of his time to activities related to the interests of 
members when the extent of member focus changes from small (S) to large 
(L), which goes at the expense of activities geared towards developing the 
cooperative enterprise. It entails that the investment is soft, because it 
establishes a positive relationship between investment in the weight of 
member focus in the performance measure and profits of the rival firm. 
Second, assume that the nature of the competitive process is characterized 
by strategic substitutes, i.e. reaction functions are downward sloping (figure 
1). Third, two cases regarding the possibilities of market entry have to be 
distinguished (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984): entry is inevitable or it is not. If 
entry is not inevitable, then a monopoly market structure arises 
endogenously by the choices of the two enterprises. Otherwise it is always a 
duopoly. 
 
The profit maximizing investment profile of the cooperative is to be 
aggressive in order to elicit a passive response by the rival, i.e. 
underinvestment in the weight put on member focus in the performance 
measure. Notice that in a setting with strategic substitutes no distinction has 
QIOF 
QCOOP 
RIOF 
RC(S) RC(L) 
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to be made regarding the entry condition. The payoff maximizing 
investment choice is the same in both cases regarding the entry condition 
because the market is characterized by a soft investment and strategic 
substitutes. This result is summarized in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: A cooperative puts a low weight on member focus in its 
performance measure in order to elicit passive behavior from a rival 
enterprise. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and further research 
This article has developed a multi-task principal-agent model in order to 
address the effects of interdependencies between upstream and downstream 
activities and strategic performance measure choice. It is established that 
the interdependency between upstream and downstream activities is a 
possible source to make the cooperative the unique efficient governance 
structure. A necessary requirement for the efficiency of the cooperative is 
that this interdependency is a chain complementarity, and that it has to be 
above a certain level. This level is increasing in the ratio of the downstream 
and upstream marginal product, i.e. the chain complementarities have to be 
stronger when the downstream marginal product increases relative to the 
upstream marginal product. It entails that cooperatives are efficient only in 
sectors where the downstream marginal product is below a certain level, 
given the level of the upstream marginal product and the strength of the 
chain complementarities. 
 
It is encouraging that the results are established in a highly stylized model. 
It provides a start for developing additional arguments for the widespread 
occurrence of cooperatives. One obvious possibility for further research is 
to relax the assumption that cooperatives have no information available 
regarding downstream activities to incorporate in the performance measure 
scheme of the CEO, e.g. accounting data or subjective performance 
measures. Relaxing this assumption may identify additional circumstances 
when the cooperative is an efficient governance structure. 
 
Second, Trechter et al. (1997) is right that the CEO is important for the 
success of a cooperative. However, enterprises have a variety of means to 
address coordination and motivation problems, of which CEO 
compensation is one. Other instruments have therefore to be considered in 
combination with CEO compensation. For example, further research may 
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incorporate additional internal control mechanism in cooperatives. The 
board of directors is usually elected by and from the membership, and is 
commonly representing member interests. It has more access to information 
inside the organization and has more at stake in the cooperative than their 
counterparts in IOFs have, and are thus expected to be a more active 
monitor and participant. 
 
Third, the principal-agent model embodies various assumptions which are 
questioned by practitioners. For example, the model posits that the principal 
is in a very powerful position because he determines the details of the 
contract, while the agent decides subsequently regarding acceptance of the 
contract and the level of activities. It seems that the model allocates too 
much power to the principal, i.e. the members. In reality the CEO has often 
substantial power due to his superior information regarding final product 
markets and the details of similar compensation packages for his position 
(Hendrikse 2007b). He is therefore in a position to propose his own 
compensation package, while the board representing the members only can 
decide to accept or reject the compensation proposal. So, there seems to be 
a skewed power relationship between the board and the CEO in favor of the 
CEO. A related observation is that many researchers today think that there 
are problems associated with the vaguely defined property rights in 
cooperatives. Future research has to determine how our results are 
influenced by the degree of CEO power. 
 
Fourth, our results can be related to growth and innovation of cooperatives 
versus IOFs. The nonmarketability of cooperative equity implies different 
attitudes towards growth between cooperatives and IOFs. Growth is the 
single most important determinant of stock price (Holmström 1999). The 
growth of an IOF results in appreciation of equity, which can be realized by 
investors through selling their shares in the secondary market. An IOF CEO 
has thus incentives to accelerate the firm growth when his own pay and 
tenure are strongly tied to the stock price (Lerman & Parliament 1991). The 
nonmarketability of cooperative equity, on the other hand, provides no 
incentives for the cooperative CEO to pursue firm growth. This is in line 
with our results predicting that the cooperative CEO spends less effort to 
advance downstream value, leading to slower growth in cooperative 
enterprises than in IOFs.  
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There are also differences to be expected regarding upstream versus 
downstream innovation. Upstream innovation mainly concerns the process 
innovation related to the existing products while the downstream innovation 
concerns development of new products. Cooperatives, according to many, 
are at a disadvantage in the innovation race with IOFs. For instance, 
Thirkell (1989) claims that cooperatives are generally not innovative or 
progressive. Given the discussion in previous sections, the emphasis of a 
cooperative on upstream member benefits entails that the process 
innovation in members’ close interests is not necessarily ineffective or 
inactive as compared with that in an IOF. A cooperative normally only 
processes (or markets) the products from its members, and this makes 
product-orientation a characteristic of the cooperative business form. 
Furthermore, the fact that members have expertise and will bring new ideas 
about their products will strengthen the cooperative’s search for product 
related differentiation. Based on our results we expect that the cooperatives 
focus more on upstream innovation with regard to the existing products 
than on the development of new products downstream. Empirical research 
has to shed light on these claims. 
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Chapter 4 
Coordination and Governance: 
The case of Cooperatives versus IOFs 
 
 ‘Perhaps the most important role of contracts is to coordinate the actions of 
independent decision makers.’ 
Bogetoft & Olesen 2002, p189 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Specialization is attractive according to the law of comparative advantages, 
but it also generates motivation and coordination problems due to the 
required exchange between specialized parties. The parties must be 
motivated to carry out their parts of the exchange, and the decisions and 
actions of the parties have to be coordinated to realize the gains of 
cooperation. A governance structure has to address these problems of 
conflicting as well as joint interests. Motivation problems can be addressed 
by designing incentives and assigning authority to reduce conflicts of 
interests and to provide the proper investment incentives, while 
coordination is required even if the parties involved have joint interests in 
order to focus on one course of action. The scientific literature has focused 
on analyzing the former, like in the agency literature (Fama & Jensen 1983) 
and the property rights literature (Grossman & Hart 1986). Coordination 
problems in a setting of joint interests have received limited attention 
during the last decades, but this is changing rapidly (for example, Alonso, 
Dessein & Matouschek 2008; Dessein & Santos 2006). 
 
As the opening citation indicates, in many production and supply chains, 
coordination is the primary concern, ensuring that production is optimized 
throughout the entire production chain and value is created through joint 
actions. For example, the harvesting of fruits and vegetables must be 
coordinated to avoid capacity problems like congestion as well as idleness 
at the factory. Coordination problems arise when there are (positive) 
externalities between different organizational units (Lazear & Gibbs 2008). 
An example is double marginalization in a chain (Spengler 1950). Vertical 
coordination entails aligning interdependent activities of various actors in a 
production chain. It requires complex information exchange, not only on 
supply and demand, but also on the quality requirements of retail customers 
and final consumers. The introduction of new products and improvement of 
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logistic efficiency also require a coordinated effort of all actors in the value 
chain (Bijman, Chaddad & Cook 2004). 
 
The literature on agricultural cooperatives pays noticeable attention to the 
coordination problem over time. Coordination aims to harmonize the 
economic activities of different economic units. It is intended to ‘achieve 
necessary adjustments of functioning of the participants without any 
encroachments upon their individuality or their independence’ (Emelianoff 
1948). It is therefore widely applied in both cooperatives and IOFs. Shaffer 
(1987) argues that the patron-owned characteristics of a cooperative 
provide the potential for advantages in coordination for cooperatives over 
IOFs since the coordination between the parties internalizes the vertical 
externality in a cooperative. However, he does not specify these advantages. 
Bogetoft & Olesen (2002) summarize ten rules of thumb in agricultural 
contract design and group them into three categories corresponding to the 
overall objectives of coordination, motivation, and minimization of 
transaction costs. Three rules relating to coordination are “coordinate 
production”, “balance the pros and cons of decentralization” and “minimize 
the costs of risk and uncertainty”. However, a relationship between 
governance structure and coordination is not outlined. Bijman, Chaddad & 
Cook (2004) build on Thompson (1967)’s theory that associates three types 
of coordination mechanisms (by standardization, by plan, or by mutual 
adjustment) to three types of interdependencies (pooled, sequential, or 
reciprocal), and apply it to various governance structures in the context of 
cooperatives. Cooperatives are characterized by all three types of 
interdependencies while IOFs in the production chains are only sequential 
interdependent. They establish that, if interdependencies shift from pooled 
to sequential to reciprocal, transactions will be governed in a more 
hierarchical way in order to economize on coordination costs. The reason is 
that more information has to be exchanged and more activities of various 
participants have to be aligned along the shift. 
           
The current article contributes to this literature by relating coordination 
mechanisms and governance structures. We examine the use of 
coordination mechanism in the vertical relationship between input supplier 
and the processor of a certain good, and link it to the choice of governance 
structure, either a cooperative or an IOF. Two ingredients drive our results: 
internalizing externalities and uncertainty. First, a cooperative is an 
enterprise collectively owned by many independent farmers as input 
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suppliers or buyers. The members own collectively a joint resource where 
they either further process or market their produce. They delegate certain 
rights to the cooperative enterprise. Subsequently, the cooperative 
enterprise concludes contracts with members, specifying for example 
delivery requirements. The vertical ties between the members and the 
processor therefore consist of a transaction element and an ownership 
element. An IOF processor is owned by outside investors and it has merely 
a transactional relationship with its input suppliers. This governance 
structure difference has an impact on the coordination problem. A 
cooperative takes into account the vertical externalities between member 
farms and the cooperative processor, whereas an IOF does not.11 
 
Second, agricultural markets are subject to a wide range of risks and 
uncertainties. Information asymmetry is precisely what we would expect to 
see in this market. There are production risks pertaining the farm operations. 
Farmers’ ability to plant and yield, and the costs of production are difficult 
to predict, “due among other things, to varying weather conditions” 
(Nilsson 2001, p332). Price volatility is another important source of risk. 
Agricultural commodity prices are subject to sharp fluctuations over 
relatively short periods of time and between geographical dispersed markets, 
depending on both local and global supply and demand conditions. 
Moreover, the market is also characterized by information asymmetry 
between different parties involved. The producers have, for instance, more 
information regarding the production stage while the processors might be 
more knowledgeable about the market prices. We incorporate this latter 
uncertainty in the model and examine the implications for organizational 
structure choices. 
 
Our study can also be seen as an extension of institutional market failure 
analysis. Williamson (1975) makes it clear that trust and goodwill among 
businessmen are essential, “A better understanding of market failure might 
                                                 
11 Notice that the consolidation of ownership in cooperatives does not imply that 
the dominant coordination mechanism should be an authority relation. Conversely, 
an authority relation, in the sense of quantity instruction, can be used 
independently from the centralization of ownership and/or residual income rights, 
such as the relational contracts among separate firms (Grandori 1997).  
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also come from studying how good estimates and revelations must be to 
allow approximate planning rather than studying how to elicit the truth” 
(Flaherty 1981, p524). 
         
We analyze in this article the choice of coordination mechanism in the 
vertical relationship between producers and a processor governed by either 
a cooperative or an IOF. Circumstances are delineated when each 
governance structure is efficient. The next section provides a 
characterization of the coordination problem. Section 4.3 sets up the model, 
followed by the equilibrium results in section 4.4. Section 4.5 formulates an 
extension. Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Coordination as a game of multiple equilibria 
Classic definitions of management include often explicitly the coordination 
problem in characterizing the field. For example, Drucker (1946) states that 
‘Management science is the science of the coordination of activities and 
processes, decision making in organizations, and optimal use of scarce 
resources (human and financial capital, materials, equipment) in order to 
reach favorable outcomes (products and services, employment, profit) for 
the organization’. Organization theory (for example Thompson 1967, 
Galbraith 1977) deals also with the coordination issues between activities 
carried out by different actors, either within the boundaries of one 
organization or among collaborators in a partnership. This article addresses 
issues regarding coordination from an economic perspective. 
 
A coordination problem can be conceptualized as a game with multiple 
equilibria (Milgrom & Roberts 1992). To illustrate, consider a situation 
with two growers and a processor. Suppose that each grower produces a 
harvest of size one and has to decide to deliver the harvest to the processor 
either today or tomorrow. During each of these two days the processor can 
handle a harvest of size one. Coordination entails that one grower delivers 
today and the other grower tomorrow. There are two equilibria: grower 1 
delivers today and grower 2 delivers tomorrow, and vice versa. Lack of 
coordination entails parties may be focusing on different equilibria, 
resulting in a coordination problem. For example, if grower 1 focuses on 
the equilibrium where grower 2 is delivering tomorrow, and grower 2 is 
focusing on the equilibrium where grower 1 is delivering tomorrow, then 
there is congestion at the processor today and idleness tomorrow. 
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Lazear & Gibbs (2008) distinguish two general types of coordination 
problems. One is called the synchronization problem which does not 
require parties involved to communicate to each other in order to coordinate. 
Examples are the synchronization of harvesting and processing of 
perishable products, the consistent overall product image, and uniform 
services provided by a firm at all of its retail locations. The other type is an 
integration problem. When there is specific knowledge rather than general 
knowledge in an organization that must be used to create firm value, and it 
is costly to communicate the knowledge to someone else, the integration 
problem arises. Should the decision making be centralized or decentralized 
is an example of such problem (Alonso, Dessein & Matouschek 2008). 
Vertical or horizontal communication is needed to solve an integration 
problem. We look at the second type of coordination problems in the 
current article, more specifically, who and how to determine the efficient 
amount of production? 
 
The solution to a coordination problem entails that the game with multiple 
equilibria is transformed into a game with one equilibrium. This can be 
done by changing the (number of) players, the choice possibilities, the 
payoffs, the information structure, or the rules of the game. One way of 
solving the synchronization problem and achieving consistency across 
employees and organizational units is to standardize practices and 
implement standard operating procedures. It entails that the number of 
choice possibilities for each player is reduced to one. There is of course a 
unique equilibrium in a game where each player has only one choice 
possibility. Milgrom & Roberts (1992) identify two solutions for an 
integration problem, namely, centralization and decentralization. Each 
solution has its advantages and disadvantages. “Either the dispersed 
information must be transmitted to a central computer or planner who is 
expected to solve the resource allocation problem or else a more 
decentralized system must be developed that involves less information 
transmission and, correspondingly, leaves at least some of the calculations 
and decisions about economic activity to those with whom the relevant 
information resides. The trick with the first option is to make timely 
decisions while keeping the costs of communication and computation from 
absorbing all the available resources low. The challenge of decentralization 
is to ensure that the separately made decisions yield a coherent, coordinated 
result”(p26). 
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Different organizational structures achieve coordination in an integration 
problem in different ways and with differing results. Weitzman (1974) 
makes this explicit by comparing the efficacy of instructions (centralization) 
versus price signals (decentralization) as coordination modes. For a 
quantity control to work, one party specifies a quota, target, or command to 
produce a certain level of output, then the other party must obey without 
consideration of how costs will be met and how rewards will be distributed 
(Flaherty 1981). With price instruments, the rules specify explicitly or 
implicitly that profits are maximized at the given prices, taking into account 
the cost and revenue. A prominent example of this type of coordination is 
the US dairy marketing orders that establish minimum prices to be paid by 
the processors for milk purchased from producers.  When there is no 
informational constraint, having the centre name prices while producers 
respond with quantities, or having the centre assign quantities while the 
producers reveal marginal costs does not make a difference. A more 
realistic issue of central control is to focus on the essential difference 
between quantities and prices as planning instruments, since quantity and 
price instruments transmit central control in quite different ways when 
uncertainty is involved. Whether it is better to directly administer 
production under scrutiny via quantity, or to fix transfer prices and rely on 
self-interested profit maximization to achieve the same ends in 
decentralized fashion is contingent on the shape of the marginal cost and 
marginal revenue curves. Notice that the first solution establishes 
coordination by reducing the choice possibilities of local parties to one, 
while the second solution entails changing the payoffs. Mintzberg (1980) 
define organizational structure as the sum total of the ways in which it 
divides its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among 
them. He distinguishes five coordination mechanisms: mutual adjustment, 
direct supervision, and the standardization of work processes, outputs, skills. 
We focus on the two mechanisms suggested by Weitzman (1974) and add 
into the analysis the features of two governance structures. In Weitzman 
(1974)’s framework, both mechanisms operate on the assumption that 
upstream units are obedient to downstream units. The coordination problem 
of concern is how to direct upstream actions with minimal loss when the 
downstream director has imperfect information about upstream costs. In the 
current article, the choice of coordination mechanisms is made by the party 
who owns and control the processing stage, i.e. farmer in a cooperative and 
processor in an IOF.  
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4.3 Model 
This section presents a non-cooperative game theoretic model regarding the 
relationship between governance structure and coordination. The decision 
making parties, the information structure, the choices, the sequence of 
decisions, and the payoffs will be specified. There are two parties: an 
upstream farmer and a downstream processor. The farmer is representative 
of all farmers together.  
 
The information structure specifies the uncertainty regarding MR and MC. 
Ex ante the information regarding the optimal decision is hardly exactly 
available even to the persons involved. However, one party may have more 
information at its disposal than the other party due to its position in the 
production process. We assume that the incompleteness of information 
resides with the farmer in a cooperative (processor in an IOF), i.e. the 
cooperative farmer (IOF processor) is unsure about the precise specification 
of the MR (MC) function. Particularly, an IOF processor may lack certain 
information regarding the marginal costs of its upstream supplier while a 
cooperative processor may incorrectly estimate the benefits of processing 
(Fleherty 1981).12 
 
There are four choices to be made. First, in order to determine the impact of 
governance structure on the incentive to produce, two governance 
structures are distinguished: a cooperative and an IOF. The identity of the 
party making the choice of coordination mechanism in the second stage of 
the game depends on the choice of governance structure. The farmer 
chooses the coordination device in a cooperative, while the processor 
determines this choice in an IOF. Second, in order to establish coordination 
between the upstream farmer and the processor, either the price or the 
quantity instrument may be adopted. That is, the cooperative can either 
specify an amount to be delivered or a price to its member farmer, while the 
IOF can either have a contract with the farmer fixing the quantity to supply 
or guaranteeing a price. Third, the farmer (processor) in a cooperative (an 
IOF) has to decide how much to produce (process) based on his information 
regarding MC (MR) and the guess of MR (MC). Finally, the actual level of 
                                                 
12  Posing the problem this way implicitly entails assuming that the cost of 
communication between the parties is high enough to warrant consideration of 
these coordination mechanisms. 
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MR and MC has to be determined. The artificial player Nature chooses the 
level of the marginal costs to be either Low (MCL) or High (MCH), each 
with probability .5, and the level of the marginal revenues to be either 
Bottom (MRB) or Top (MRT), each with probability .5.  
 
The game consists of four stages. The choice of governance structure 
(cooperative or IOF) is made in the first stage. A coordination mechanism 
(price or quantity coordination) is then chosen by the farmer (the processor) 
in a cooperative (an IOF) in the second stage of the game. Subsequently the 
cooperative member make a guess regarding the MR of the processor, or 
the IOF processor makes a guess on the MC of the upstream farmer. In the 
fourth stage Nature determines the real MR and MC. 
 
The payoff differences between a cooperative and an IOF are due to the two 
governance structures having different objective functions. A cooperative 
takes into account not only the downstream surplus but also the upstream 
surplus while an IOF processor is merely concerned with the downstream 
surplus. That is, a cooperative processor internalizes how its decisions 
affect the farmers, whereas an IOF processor does not. In order to delineate 
the implications of this distinction for the choice of coordination 
mechanism and the efficiency of a governance structure, we will specify the 
payoffs of the upstream farmer and the downstream processor. 
 
Consider first a situation of a cooperative where the actual marginal 
revenue is MRB and the farmer has a belief either MRB or MRT (figure 1). 
Notice that by definition a cooperative acquires the entire surplus generated 
in the transaction whereas the processor earns nothing. It entails that the 
payoff of the processor is always zero in a cooperative regardless of the 
choice of coordination mechanism and the belief of a farmer regarding the 
MR. If the farmer possesses an exact account of the MR, the upstream 
payoff is A+B regardless the choice of coordination mechanism. The price 
instrument will specify PE, and an output level QE will be chosen. The 
quantity instrument will specify QE. 
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Figure 1: A cooperative 
 
If the farmer overestimates the MR, then the size of the surplus depends on 
the choice of coordination mechanism. The price instrument determines a 
transfer price PH. The processor faces therefore a MC equal to PH and the 
intersection of PH and MRB determines that the processor procures an 
amount QL. The surplus is therefore A when the price mechanism is 
adopted. Similarly, the quantity mechanism determines a quantity QH and 
the surplus is A+B-C. The payoffs when the actual MR is MRT and the 
farmer has a belief either MRB or MRT can be calculated in the same 
manner. 13 
 
                                                 
13  We limit the presentation of the extensive form in figure 1 to reflect the 
uncertainty regarding MR when a cooperative prevails. The two levels of MC 
would only result in presenting figure 1 twice. One figure would have MCL and 
the surfaces AL, BL, CL and DL, while the other figure would have MCH and the 
surfaces AH, BH, CH and DH. This is the reason why MC, rather than MCL and 
MCH, is presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 2 depicts the extensive form when the governance structure 
cooperative is chosen in the first stage. The farmer chooses first the 
coordination mechanism and then his belief regarding MR. Subsequently, 
Nature determines the true level of MR. Finally, the first number presents 
the payoff of the farmer, while the number below is the payoff of the 
processor. The payoff of the processor is always 0 in a cooperative because 
the farmer receives the entire surplus. The surplus received by the farmer in 
the various circumstances is retrieved from figure 1.  
 
Figure 2: The extensive form of the game when the cooperative prevails 
 
Consider next a situation of an IOF where the actual MC is MCH and the 
IOF processor’s belief is either MCL or MCH. If the belief is consistent with 
the real MC, then the payoffs of the farmer and the processor are C+D+E 
and A+B (figure 3), respectively, regardless the choice of coordination 
mechanism. The price mechanism would determine the transfer price PE, 
while the quantity mechanism would determine the efficient quantity QE. If 
the processor underestimates the MC, then the payoff of the farmer and the 
processor depend on the choice of coordination mechanism. If the price 
instrument is chosen, then the MR received by the farmer is equal to PL, i.e. 
the transfer price is determined by the intersection of the MR facing the 
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processor and MCL. An output level QL will be chosen. Thus the payoff of 
the farmer is E, while the payoff of the processor is A+C. Similarly, if the 
quantity instrument is chosen, then the intersection of the MR and MCL 
determines that an output QH has to be delivered. The farmer earns E-D-2F-
G, while the processor receives a payoff A+B+C+2D+F. The payoffs of 
both parties can be calculated in the same way when the actual marginal 
cost is MCL and the IOF processor’s belief is either MCL or MCH. 
Figure 3: An IOF 
 
Figure 4 depicts the extensive form when the governance structure IOF is 
chosen in the first stage. The processor chooses first the coordination 
mechanism and then his belief regarding MC. Subsequently, Nature reveals 
the true level of MC. Finally, the first number presents the payoff of the 
farmer, while the number below is the payoff of the processor. The payoffs 
in the various circumstances are retrieved from figure 3.  
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Figure 4: The extensive form of the game when the IOF prevails 
 
4.4 Equilibrium 
A cooperative takes into account not only the downstream surplus but also 
the upstream surplus, while an IOF processor is merely concerned with the 
downstream surplus. That is, a cooperative internalizes externalities, 
whereas an IOF does not. This entails that different coordination 
mechanisms may be employed in the two governance structures. This claim 
will be made specific by determining the subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the model with the method of backward induction. The choice of 
coordination mechanism in the second stage of the game is therefore 
addressed first, given the choice of governance structure. Subsequently, the 
choice of governance structure is addressed, anticipating the equilibrium 
choice of coordination mechanism in the next stage of the game. 
 
The choice of coordination mechanism in a cooperative is entirely guided 
by the size of the total surplus. We have therefore  
 
Proposition 1: The choice of coordination mechanism in a cooperative is 
efficient.  
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This proposition is consistent with the findings of Flaherty (1981) that if the 
relation between upstream unit and downstream unit is expected to endure 
for a long time and if it is expected to require much renegotiation at each 
point in time because a lot of uncertainties are involved, then financial 
integration may generate more joint profits. 
 
For a cooperative, the expected payoffs of making a guess of B or T are 
identical, given the choice of coordination mechanism. The expected payoff 
associated with a guess is (2A+B+C+D)/2 when the price mechanism is 
chosen, while it is (2A+2B+D)/2 when the quantity mechanism is adopted. 
Both coordination mechanisms generate the same surplus when the guess 
turns out to be right, but the surplus differs when the guess is wrong. The 
surplus B is the deadweight loss when the price mechanism is used and the 
surplus C when the quantity mechanism is used. We have therefore that the 
total surplus generated by a cooperative with the price instrument is higher 
(lower) than the total surplus generated by a cooperative with the quantity 
instrument when C>B (C<B). It can be shown (Weitzman 1974; Milgrom 
& Roberts 1992) that C>B (C<B) corresponds with the slope of the MR 
being more (less) steep than the slope of the MC. Denote the slope of the 
MR as SMR and the slope of the MC as SMC. This result is summarized in 
proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: A cooperative will choose the price (quantity) mechanism  
when SMR  > SMC (SMR  < SMC). 
 
The above result indicates that a market mechanism like the price can be 
efficiently used in addition to hierarchy within a single firm, i.e. even 
though property rights over assets are not assigned to difference actors. 
There are situations in which either price or quantity control must be used 
to minimize losses in net joint profits. 
  
It is obvious that the choice of coordination mechanism in an IOF is not 
always efficient because it is based only on the payoff of the processor 
rather than total surplus. For example, payoff G (figure 4) is never taken 
into account by the processor. However, payoff G matters in the total 
surplus generated by the IOF when the price mechanism is in place, 
whereas it does not (on average) when the quantity mechanism is used. The 
extensive form in figure 4 reveals immediately that the quantity instrument 
performs better from the processor’s point of view. The processor will 
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receive the same payoffs when the guess turns out to be right, but her 
payoff will be strictly lower with the price instrument when the guess turns 
out to be wrong because a larger share of the surplus goes to the upstream 
farmer. Quantity is thus the preferred planning instrument for an IOF.14 
This result is formulated in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: An IOF will choose the quantity mechanism.  
 
Figure 5 visualizes the main insight of propositions 2 and 3. The choice of 
coordination mechanism by each governance structure is presented in terms 
of the slope of the MR (SMR) and the slope of the MC (SMC), where ji 
represents the choice of coordination mechanism j (Q or P) by governance 
structure i (C for cooperative or F for IOF).  
 
 
Figure 5: Choice of coordination mechanism 
         
                                                 
14 The quantity mechanism is chosen by the processor because when the estimates 
are wrong, the total surplus does not change with the coordination mechanisms but 
a larger share of the total surplus goes to her. If the upstream party cares only 
about upstream surplus and is the decision maker, then the price mechanism will 
be chosen. 
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An IOF chooses a coordination mechanism based on the downstream 
surplus it acquires. Therefore the choice is not necessarily optimal in terms 
of total surplus. Yet an efficient coordination mechanism can be chosen if 
both the downstream surplus and the total surplus generated with a certain 
mechanism are higher than those with the other mechanism. We know 
already from proposition 3 that the downstream surplus associated with 
quantity control is higher than that associated with price control. So we 
investigate next if and when the total surplus associated with quantity 
control exceeds that associated with price control. The total surplus of an 
upstream farmer and an IOF processor can be represented by the area of 
2A+B+2C+2D+2E+F+G+H when the price control is applied and by the 
area of 2A+2B+2C+3D+2E+H when the quantity control is used. It can be 
shown that the quantity control is more attractive than the price control 
when SMR > SMC. This result is stated in proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: The choice of coordination mechanism in an IOF is efficient  
when SMR > SMC. 
 
Having determined the efficient coordination mechanism choice for each 
governance structure, we will identify next the efficient governance 
structure. It will depend on the choice of coordination mechanism and the 
importance of the lack of information regarding MR or MC. This argument 
is presented for the case where SMR  < SMC and the MCH and MRB are the 
true MC and MR curves (figure 6). Denote the vertical distance between the 
actual and estimated MC as ΔC and the vertical distance between the actual 
and estimated MR as ΔR. Notice that (line segment DE implies that) ΔC is 
taken to be equal to ΔR in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: An illustration of total surplus generated in two governance 
structures 
According to proposition 2, a cooperative will choose the quantity 
mechanism when SMR < SMC, and the total surplus can be represented by the 
area of ABC-ADE. According to proposition 3, an IOF will always choose 
the quantity control and the total surplus can also be represented by the area 
of ABC-ADE. That is, a cooperative and an IOF are equally efficient when 
ΔC = ΔR. 
 
Suppose that the cooperative’s information about the MR becomes more 
accurate, i.e. ΔR < ΔC. It is represented in figure 6 by a downward shift of 
the estimate MR curve to MR’T. The total surplus increases to ABC-AGH, 
making a cooperative uniquely efficient. Likewise, an IOF will become 
uniquely efficient if its information about the MC becomes more accurate, 
i.e. ΔR > ΔC. It can be shown in a similar manner that when SMR > SMC, a 
cooperative is uniquely efficient if ΔR < (SMR / SMC) *ΔC and an IOF is 
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uniquely efficient if ΔR > (SMR / SMC) *ΔC15. This result is summarized in 
proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5: When SMR < SMC, a cooperative (an IOF) is uniquely 
efficient if ΔR < ΔC (ΔR > ΔC); when SMR > SMC, a cooperative is uniquely 
efficient if ΔR < (SMR / SMC) *ΔC and an IOF is uniquely efficient if ΔR > 
(SMR / SMC) *ΔC. 
 
We have shown earlier that the choice of coordination mechanism in a 
cooperative is efficient (proposition 1), whereas it is not always in an IOF. 
However, a loss of surplus is always associated with each coordination 
mechanism. This is inevitable due to the lack of information. The 
cooperative lacks information regarding MR, whereas the IOF lacks 
information regarding the MC. An IOF may therefore be an efficient 
governance structure when its estimate of MC is more accurate compared to 
a cooperative’s estimate of MR, despite its choice of coordination 
mechanism being inefficient. The efficient governance structure choice is 
visualized in figures 7.16 
 
Figure 7: Efficient governance structure 
                                                 
15 The ratio of the two slopes shows up only when SMR > SMC due to the fact that a 
cooperative and an IOF use different coordination mechanism while they both use 
quantity control when SMR < SMC. 
16 This is in line with the argument of Alchian (1950) that efficient behaviors 
survive, while inefficient behavior does not. To be more specific, the governance 
structure generating the highest total surplus is adopted in the first stage of the 
game, like in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
 
ΔR 
IOF 
ΔC 
COOP 
ΔR = (SMR / SMC) *ΔC 
80 
 
 
Notice that there will always be coordination based on the quantity 
mechanism when the swings in MR are relatively large compared to the 
swings in MC. In the special case where the farmers in a cooperative have 
perfect information regarding the marginal revenue as well as marginal, i.e. 
ΔR=0, the choice of coordination mechanism is irrelevant because both 
mechanism will lead to the same optimal result.  
 
4.5 Upstream focus by the cooperative 
It is difficult to refrain from noticing that although cooperative members 
have both upstream and downstream interests, they seem to be more 
concerned with the value added to their individual farm enterprises. “The 
income that a stockholder derives from an IOF depends on the firm’s 
‘bottom line’, but the income of a cooperative’s stockholder often depends 
more on the prices of the individual goods and services purchased from the 
cooperative than on the organization’s overall profitability” (Staatz 1987). 
There are various possible explanations for the dominance of user value in 
the perception of members. On the one hand, the limitation on dividend 
payments and the members’ inability to capture capital gains in a 
cooperative may account for member’s preference to direct benefits in the 
form of transfer prices (Staatz 1987). On the other hand, the frequency of 
transactions may play a role. Cooperative members are users on an almost 
daily basis, while owner-investors are only several times a year (tax day, 
equity redemption day, dividend day). This frequent-use interface relative 
to the investor interface reinforces a constant message that price and quality 
of the cooperative’s services and goods affect the members’ bottom line, 
which is more important (in the short run and for the individual member) 
than the bottom line of the cooperative (Cook 1994). For these purposes, 
each farmer may free ride on the common cooperative enterprise and take 
merely the individual producer surplus into account. 
           
The analysis of a cooperative with upstream focus proceeds in a similar 
way as the analysis in the previous section. Figure 8 presents several 
additional areas compared to figure 1 because upstream and downstream 
surplus have to be distinguished in order to account for the upstream focus 
by the cooperative. 
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Figure 8: A cooperative with upstream focus 
 
The extensive form of the game when the cooperative with an upstream 
focus prevails (figure 9) is different from figure 2 in terms of the payoffs of 
the upstream and downstream parties. Figure 8 defines the areas that 
correspond to the payoffs in figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Extensive form when the cooperative with upstream focus 
prevails 
 
The extensive form in figure 9 reveals immediately that the upstream 
focused farmer prefers always the quantity instrument to the price 
instrument. The processor will receive the same payoffs when the guess 
turns out to be right, but her payoff will be strictly lower with the price 
instrument when the guess turns out to be wrong because a larger share of 
the surplus goes to the downstream processor. The cooperative will 
therefore adopt the same coordination mechanism as an IOF. This result is 
formulated in proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6: A cooperative with upstream focus will choose the quantity 
mechanism.  
          
Another observation is that the payoffs associated with Top are larger than 
those associated with Bottom when the quantity instrument is used, which 
means that the production plan of the farmer will always be based on MRT. 
If the estimate is correct, the cooperative will end up with an optimal 
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quantity of delivery. If the estimate is wrong, the quantity of delivery will 
be higher than the optimal one. That is, the delivery level of a cooperative 
with upstream focus will not be lower than the optimal level. 
 
Proposition 7: A cooperative with upstream focus is likely to overproduce. 
          
The result in the above proposition accords well with observations reported 
from most agricultural markets that cooperatives do have large volume of 
production and large market shares in the collection and primary processing 
of the raw produce (Nilsson 2001).  
 
A cooperative with upstream focus chooses a coordination mechanism 
based only on the upstream surplus. Therefore the choice is not always 
optimal in terms of total efficiency. Yet an efficient coordination 
mechanism can be chosen if both the upstream surplus and the total surplus 
generated with a certain coordination mechanism are higher than those with 
the alternative coordination mechanism. Proposition 6 indicates that the 
downstream surplus associated with quantity control is higher than that 
associated with price control. So we investigate next if and when the total 
surplus associated with quantity control exceeds that associate with price 
control. The total surplus of the cooperative can be represented by the area 
of 2A+2B+2C+2D+E+F+G+H when the price control is employed and by 
the area of 2A+2B+3C+2D+2E+F when the quantity control is used. It can 
be shown that the former is smaller than the latter when SMC > SMR, i.e., 
quantity control is efficient when the MC curve is steeper than the MR 
curve. 
 
Proposition 8: The choice of coordination mechanism in a cooperative with 
upstream focus is efficient when SMC > SMR. 
 
Proposition 6 indicates that a cooperative with upstream focus will choose 
the same coordination mechanism as an IOF. It can be easily shown with 
figure 6 that when the estimates on MR and MC are inaccurate to the same 
extent, the total surplus generated by a cooperative with upstream focus 
equals that generated by an IOF. Therefore the efficient governance 
structure is the one with more accurate estimate.  
 
Proposition 9: A cooperative with upstream focus (an IOF) is uniquely 
efficient if ΔR < ΔC (ΔR > ΔC). 
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The efficient organizational structure choice, depending on the relative 
accuracy of the estimates of MC and MR, is visualized in figures 10. 
 
Figure 10: Efficient governance structure 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The coordination mechanism choice in a cooperative and an IOF and the 
efficiency of the two governance structures is analyzed. Due to the “owner 
as user” characteristic, a cooperative internalizes the vertical externalities 
between upstream producers and the downstream processor, maximizing 
their joint profits, and will adopt therefore the efficient coordination 
mechanism. This contrasts with IOFs, where the coordination mode linking 
the upstream and downstream units is not always efficient. The slope of the 
MC and MR determines whether the price or quantity control is adopted. 
Each governance structure can be uniquely efficient, which depends on the 
importance of lacking information upstream or downstream.  
 
It is undoubtedly worthwhile to test the propositions. Even though a general 
prediction on governance structure or coordination mechanism requires 
examining all the activities performed by the constituent units and all the 
relevant conditions, we expect that a good prediction may be made by 
studying only the most important attributes. However, we leave careful 
testing for later, we proceed to list some extensions to the theory required to 
make it more useful and closer to the real practices.  
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There are various possibilities for future research regarding the relationship 
between coordination and governance structure. We indicate two 
possibilities. First, a simplifying assumption of our model is that there are 
physical communication constraints between the producers and the 
processors, which limits information transmission between the party that is 
best informed and the party with a natural disadvantage. An obvious way to 
enrich the model is to incorporate the informational flow. The cooperative 
members may be more willing to provide higher quality, more frequent, and 
more truthful information to the cooperative than they would to an IOF 
(Cook, 1994), rendering better vertical information transmission in a 
cooperative than in an IOF. This suggests an additional advantage of 
coordination by cooperatives. One can go even further to examine the 
conditions under which the costly communication is worthwhile.  
 
Second, a cooperative is characterized by a processor (or wholesaler, or 
retailer) being owned by an upstream party (vertical relationship), where 
the upstream party consists of an association of many independent growers 
(horizontal relationship). This article has addressed coordination issues 
regarding the vertical relationship. Hart and Holmstrom (2010) address 
issues regarding governance and coordination between units that have a 
lateral relationship. Future efforts might be fruitfully devoted to 
investigating how the vertical alignment interacts with the horizontal 
coordination between the members. 
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Chapter 5 
Cognition and Governance Structure 
 The firm is a focusing device. 
Nooteboom (2006) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Nowadays, the modern business world witnesses an increasing awareness 
of people’s, and therefore firms’, inability to handle complex situations 
effectively and costlessly. To survive and become successful, managers 
must ensure that effective knowledge is being created and assembled in a 
meaningful manner. Information regarding their own operation and the 
environment in which they are running their business has to be forthcoming 
and well interpreted. One critical role of decision makers of a firm is to 
‘make inferences about the environment in which they operate, an activity 
dependent on their ability to analyze the situation’ (Rubinstein 1998, p4). 
They need to evaluate changing market conditions, contemplate 
competitive strategies, decide on new products, production technologies, 
new markets, and so forth.  
 
Decision making in organizations is the result of both the limited cognitive 
capacity of humans and the structural influences of governance structures 
on an individual’s attention (Simon 1947). First, since firms are run by 
managers, one cannot ignore the human factor and the unavoidable 
boundedness of the ability and rationality of human beings (Simon 1955). 
In analyzing the behavior of firms, the standard economic literature relies 
on the assumption of perfect rationality of agents, which assumes that there 
is no limit to the ability of people to calculate, to remember, to foresee, to 
distinguish, or to plan (Fershtman & Kalai 1993). Decision making requires 
judgment and knowledge of the specifics of complex situations. However, 
the amount of attention, knowledge and computational capacity that any 
central decision maker has is limited. Second, Hammond (1994, p101) 
raises the question of “Why structure matters?” A governance structure is a 
distinct constellation of income rights and control rights, and it channels 
and structures information. Hammond’s answer is addressing the latter part 
by stating that “a firm’s structure can be expected to shape, constrain, and 
otherwise influence the development and content of the firm’s strategy” 
(p99). As Nooteboom (2006) puts it, the firm is a focusing device. 
Governance structures differ in the way they process information, i.e. a 
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governance structure is not neutral in the processing of information 
(Hammond & Thomas 1989). Errors are typically systematic (Conlisk 
1996), i.e. each governance structure creates its own biases in decision 
making. One of the roles of a governance structure is to limit the harmful 
consequences of bounded cognition at the individual level. 
 
Decision-making requires information and information has to be acquired, 
processed and categorized to form a meaningful partition (Fulton & 
Gibbings 2006). We use information partition to capture the way people 
sort information. An unboundedly rational agent is able to partition 
different types of signals into distinct categories, while an agent with 
limited cognitive ability can distinguish only part of the information and the 
remaining part therefore has to be grouped into one category. The different 
foci of firms and agents entail different knowledge sets. The primary 
purpose of this article is to examine how governance structures differ in 
their organization of the cognition of boundedly rational agents, and 
identify the efficient governance structure. We aim to answer the following 
questions in this article: 1) How do different governance structures differ in 
their allocation of attention? 2) What determines the efficient governance 
structure? These questions are addressed in a proposal selection project 
implementation setting. Agents confronted with all kinds of business ideas 
and opportunities are not rational enough to identify and correctly 
implement all of them. Their limited cognitive ability and the governance 
structure of the firm shape their knowledge, which in turn determine their 
expected benefit and loss. The agents make decisions on proposal selection 
based these expected benefit and loss. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous 
research on bounded cognition and governance structures. The governance 
structures are distinguished from a bounded cognition perspective in section 
3. Section 4 identifies the bias of each governance structure and the 
efficient governance structure. Section 5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature 
Since Coase (1937), the concept of transaction costs has been used to 
explain the nature and limits of the firm. Transaction cost theory, in general, 
maintains that firms are established to avoid some of the transaction costs 
in the market. A company grows when the external transaction costs are 
high relative to the internal transaction costs. If the external transaction 
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costs are lower than the internal transaction costs the company will be 
downsized by for instance outsourcing. The ideas of Coase (1937) have 
been developed by many scholars, notably Williamson (1985), Grossman & 
Hart (1986) and Hart (2008). The central theme is that the rules by which 
institutions are governed affect the investment level in transaction specific 
assets and alternative ownership structures. The concern is how ex post 
opportunism, due to incomplete contracts, affects the investment level, and 
how reallocation of the ownership of the assets alleviates suboptimal 
investment. Williamson (1986, p110) traces transaction costs to agents’ 
limited cognitive abilities: ‘Economizing on transaction costs essentially 
reduces to economizing on bounded rationality…’. 
 
Transaction costs economics has stressed the role of governance structure 
in alleviating the ex ante as well as ex post problems. The problems 
associated with asset specificity are driving the analysis. However, many 
problems are so complex that only a limited number of choices can be 
anticipated ex ante. As a consequence, complexity rather than asset 
specificity may guide the choice of governance structure (Hendrikse 2003). 
This raises the cognitive issues of decision making. Examples are the price 
system economizing on attention (Hayek 1945), the competence-difficulty 
gap (Heiner 1983), organizational design to protect against the mistakes of 
fallible decision maker (Sah & Stiglitz 1986, Sobel 1992),  the coordination 
of activities within the firm (Milgrom & Roberts 1988), making inferences 
about the market environment (Rubinstein 1998), outsourcing (Tadelis 
2002), the impact of the manager’s attention (Gifford 2004),  information 
partitions (Cremer et al. 2007), the spinning off of business lines to 
concentrate on the core business and to strengthen the abilities to compete 
(Fershtman & Kalai 1993), and so on. 
 
Bounded rationality results in a theory of firm boundaries (Cremer et al. 
2007). Nooteboom (2006) introduces the notion of a firm as a focusing 
device and explains the scope and boundaries of the firm. The need to 
achieve a focus in a firm however entails “a risk of myopia: relevant threats 
and opportunities to the firm are not perceived” (p158) and a bias specific 
to this type of firm. Limited attention is at the core of the analysis of 
hierarchies in Bolton & Dewatripont (1995) and Aghion & Tirole (1995). It 
captures the fact that ‘deliberation about an economic decision is a costly 
activity’ (Conlisk 1996, p669). The delegation of decision making authority 
within an integrated organization is studied. Both models assume that the 
90 
 
opportunity cost of attention is exogenous and the size of the firm is fixed. 
Gifford (2004) presents a cognitive explanation of the decision by a firm to 
make an input within the firm rather than to out-source the production to 
another firm. A tradeoff between adopting new behaviors and adapting 
current behaviors is specified. Ortoleva (2008) defines the notion of 
thinking aversion, much in line with the definitions of risk or ambiguity 
aversion. It is the sum of the cost to find the optimal choice in a set and the 
cost to find out which is the optimal choice. “…the concept of ‘cost of 
thinking’ is connected to the broad notion of bounded rationality, 
understood as the presence of some form of constraints to the ability of the 
agent to process information: the cost of thinking could be seen as a way to 
represent such computational constraints” (p4). Decision making is thus 
characterized by a tradeoff. On the one hand, the agent prefers larger sets 
due to having more options to choose from. On the other hand, smaller sets 
since avoid the disutility associated with having to think about what to 
choose.   
 
Read et al (1999) introduce the concept of “choice bracketing”, a term that 
designates the grouping of individual choices into sets. They distinguish 
narrow bracketing “with an eye to the local consequences of one or a few 
choices” and broad bracketing “with an eye to the global consequences of 
many choices” (p172). Cognitive limitations in perception, attention, 
memory, and analytical processing, are argued to be “one important 
determinant of bracketing” (p187). Fryer & Jackson (2008) provide a link 
between categorization and social decision making. They build a model of 
how experiences are sorted into categories and how categorization affects 
decision making. They show that types of experiences and objects that are 
less frequent in the population tend to be more coarsely categorized and 
lumped together. As a result, decision makers make less accurate 
predictions when encountering such objects.  
 
Sah & Stiglitz (1986) make an important contribution relating people’s 
judgmental errors with the efficiency of various organizational forms. They 
distinguish different organizational forms with regard to how the agents are 
organized together and how the decision making authority is distributed in a 
system. The current article examines also the influence of the omission 
errors and commission errors on the relative performance of governance 
structures. We differ from Sah & Stiglitz (1986) by making the omission 
errors and the commission errors of an agent dependent on the governance 
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structure because the model characterizes each governance structure with a 
distinct information partition. Instead of having either a good or bad project, 
the agents in our model face a variety of possible states regarding each task 
or project. They accept or reject proposals based on the expected benefit 
due to correctly identifying the state and the expected loss due to 
misidentifying the state. We believe that our proposal selection process 
captures better the structuring of information by a governance structure. 
There are rarely clearly right or wrong projects, but most of the initiatives 
have both potential benefits and potential loss. The matter is how 
governance structure shapes the ability of the agents to identify various 
ideas and possibilities.   
 
There are several ways to position our article in the literature. First, the 
behavioral assumptions opportunism and bounded rationality are often used 
in the analysis of governance structure. Most contributions start with 
opportunism, like transaction costs economics, while this article highlights 
the assumption of bounded cognition. It is in line with the behavioral 
approach following Simon (1955). People are not perfectly rational. When 
confronted with a situation they have available to them only a limited set of 
strategies or actions, and will only consider a small number of them. The 
reason for this could be many, but is likely due in part to a lack of 
awareness about the actions’ availability. We attempt to merge standard 
modeling ingredients like optimization and efficiency with bounded 
rational ingredients like partition and cognition. Second, there are various 
ways of modeling a firm, like a production function (Debreu, 1959), a 
contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or a set of assets (Grossman & Hart 
1986, Hart 2008). This article views the firm as a partition. We characterize 
various governance structures in terms of information partitions and 
analyze the bias of governance structures in a bounded rationality 
framework. Third, a recent development in the theory of the firm is the 
cognitive theory of the firm (Nooteboom 2006). It claims that different 
people possess different information to the extent that they have developed 
in different social and physical surroundings and have not interacted with 
each other. As a result, they see the world differently. The firm provides 
both a cognitive framework for interpreting data and intellectual habits or 
routines for transforming information into useful knowledge. Firms may 
also differ in their abilities to assemble and classify information and 
consequently to create knowledge, because of the manner in which they are 
structured (Fulton & Gibbings 2006). The governance structure encasing 
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the firm “focuses its attention, creates its unique view of the environment, 
limits its search and investigation” (Burton & Kuhn 1979, p4). On the basis 
of different experiences, with different technologies and different markets, 
different contexts in which they have developed, and different 
organizational histories, different firms perceive, interpret, understand and 
categorize phenomena differently, creating different information in the 
supply chain. Our model evaluates how governance structures vary in the 
focus they provide.  
 
5.3 Governance structures from a bounded cognition perspective 
We distinguish various governance structures in terms of partitions (section 
5.3.1) and probabilities (section 5.3.2).  
 
5.3.1 Partitions 
Start with two agents, an upstream dairy farmer (F) and a downstream milk 
processor (P). Farmers’ production portfolio typically consists of more than 
just one product. We capture this by assuming that the upstream farmer has 
two production activities. (S)he produces potato in addition to milk which 
subsequently is handled by the processor. The processor has also two 
activities, milk processing and development of other dairy products like 
cheese, yogurt or ice cream. Both agents are confronted with a stream of 
heterogeneous opportunities associated with these four distinct activities. 
Examples of these business ideas and opportunities are product and process 
innovation, R&D, divestiture, marketing promotion, actions to cope with 
the competitors’ threats, the inter-functional coordination, and collaboration 
with other peers, and the like. The complex and time-consuming task of 
dealing with these ideas involves both decision on accepting or rejecting a 
proposal and then implementing the adopted project in a productive way. 
There is, in effect, uncertainty about the environment and the opportunity 
itself, which entails that the agents’ perception of the environment is 
inevitably partial and fragmentary and his knowledge about how to 
implement a project is consequently incomplete. For simplicity, denote a 
project associated with the upstream milk production as U1, that associated 
with the potato production as U2, that associated with the downstream milk 
processing as D1, and finally those associated with the development of 
other dairy products as D2. The project set to be identified is therefore^ `1 2 1 2, , ,U U D D .  
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The ability to correctly identify and implement a project is clearly one of 
the key ingredients of successful management. If the agents are unbounded 
rational, they would have an adequate understanding of the situation and be 
aware whether the state of the environment requires U1, U2, D1 or D2 and 
carry out the project accordingly. The reality is often different and 
complicated. It is difficult to anticipate or consider all alternatives and all 
information. A decision maker may deal with complexity by storing past 
experiences in a finite set of categories. This finiteness of the set of 
categories reflects the central idea of bounded cognition that the number of 
categories used by the decision maker is small relative to the complexity of 
the environment (Heiner 1983). It follows that the decision maker’s ability 
to have one category for each kind of problem is inhibited. So (s)he is 
forced to group heterogeneous events in the same category. In agricultural 
production, there are considerable uncertainties due to, among other things, 
varying weather conditions and uncertain market developments. The 
quantity of the produce is often not completely known to the processor. 
Only the farmer knows exactly whether the potato yield this year is higher, 
lower, or the same as last year. And the prices of the produce are often 
difficult to assess by the farmer. A farmer is usually not in a good position 
to tell the trends of price fluctuation. In other words, there is information 
asymmetry of various kinds (Nilsson 2001, p332). Alternatively, grouping 
heterogeneous events into one category can be interpreted as limited 
understanding. Each agent with a limited number of cognitive units may 
have detailed knowledge of some specific situations, which makes it easy to 
identify some states but not others. For example, a farmer is usually apt to 
be singularly minded with respect to some particular commodities and a 
geographical area (Clodius 1957). It is likely that the farmer knows when 
an action relating to the production stage is necessary as he is 
knowledgeable about his own business U1 and U2, but it may be costly for 
him to distinguish D1 and D2, which are sorted more coarsely into one 
category. The partition reflecting such a farmer is denoted as 
^ `1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( , )U U D D .17 
 
                                                 
17 To keep it simple, we assume that each type of project can be assigned to just 
one subset, although we realize that in the real world there might be projects 
associated with a combination of various activities and this assumption is with 
some loss of generality. 
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A governance structure systematically affects what information is made 
available to the agents (Hammond 1994). Here we distinguish four 
governance structures, namely, Market (M), Cooperative (C), Forward 
Integration (FI), and Backward Integration (BI). The influence of 
governance structure on the agents’ partition of information is so pervasive 
that both agents have a distinct partition in different governance structure. 
The precise partitions can be specified in a few ways, but the crucial aspect 
is the direction of the differences between governance structures. By 
Market we mean that two agents are independent. We assume that they both 
can distinguish the problems associated with their own activities.  A 
Cooperative is set up when a group of farmers collectively own the 
processor. To simplify we treat the group of farmers as one agent. With the 
farmer’s acquisition of the downstream control, the processor becomes an 
employee of the farmer, which reduces the processor’s attention on the 
downstream activities. (S)he will thus concentrate only on D1 given the 
farmer’s particular interest in milk processing. The farmer as the owner of 
the cooperative has to gain knowledge on the downstream stage of 
production and therefore make partitions with regard to both the upstream 
and downstream activities. By Forward Integration we mean that the 
farmer’s activities are expanded to include control of the processing of 
his/her products. In other words, the dairy processor is owned by the farmer. 
What distinguish FI from C is that the owner of the chain does not 
necessarily focus more attention on one of the products, like milk for the 
dairy cooperative. The two upstream activities are thus equally important, 
and so are the two downstream activities. The processor in FI is an 
employee of the farmer, and is less attentive regarding the downstream 
activities than (s)he would be in the Market, i.e. D1 and D2 are grouped in 
one subset. Backward Integration is similar with FI. The difference is that 
the processor acquires the ownership of the farm. The partition of each 
agent in the four governance structures is shown in table 1.  
 
 M C FI BI 
Farmer  ^ 1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( , )U U D D
 
^ 1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( ), (U U D D
 
^ 1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( ), (U U D D
 
^ `1 2 1 2( , ), ( , )U U D D  
Processor ^ 1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( , )D D U U
 
^ `1 2 1 2( ), ( , , )D D U U
 
^ `1 2 1 2( , ), ( , )D D U U
 
^ `1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( ), ( )D D U U
 
Table 1: The partition of each agent in each governance structure 
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5.3.2 Probabilities 
Partitions are associated with the probabilities that the agents in various 
governance structures correctly or incorrectly identify a state. Assume the 
probabilities associated with the four states are    1 2 12p U p U p  , 
   1 2 1 (1 )2p D p D p   with 0 1p  .  
 
Before implementing any project, an agent has to decide which of the 
following four projects ^ `1 2 1 2, , ,U U D D is needed. Each agent can correctly 
select some of the states without uncertainty due to the fact that they are 
perfect knowledgeable about these states. For examples, the farmer in the 
Market can identify U1 and U2 whereas the processor indentifies D1 and D2. 
With regard to other states, the agents may assign a certain probability of 
selecting each one of them, depending on the probability that each state 
actually occurs. Figure 1 represents in the extensive form the bounded 
cognition of the processor in Cooperative. Nature presents itself to the 
processor in two information sets. The first information set consists of one 
node. It reflects that the processor observes the choice D1 by Nature. The 
solution of the problem, or the implementation of the project, will be 
tailored entirely to state D1. The second information set consists of three 
nodes. It reflects that either U1, U2 or D2 has to be in place, but that the 
actual state is not known to the processor with certainty. (S)he has to 
choose U1, U2 or D2 without knowing what the actual state is. Bounded 
cognition entails that p(U1|D2)=p(U1|U1)=p(U1|U2), p(U2|D2) 
=p(U2|U1)=p(U2|U2) and p(D2|D2)=p(D2|U1)=p(D2|U2) . 
 
Figure 1: Bounded cognition of the processor in Cooperative 
To generalize, we define Г(k) as the probability matrix of agent k in 
governance structure Г, where Гij(k) is the probability that state j is selected 
by agent k in governance structure Г when the actual state is i. Table 2 
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Selected 
state 
Selected 
state 
Actual 
state 
Actual 
state 
shows C(F). The farmer in the Cooperative is able to identify all the states, 
i.e.  
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1U U U U D D D DC F C F C F C F    . The diagonal cells are 
filled with the probabilities that the right states are chosen while the off-
diagonal elements reflect choosing the wrong state.  
 
  
U1 
 
U2 
 
D1 
 
D2 
U1 1 0 0 0 
U2 0 1 0 0 
D1 0 0 1 0 
D2 0 0 0 1 
Table 2: State probabilities of the farmer in the Cooperative 
 
Similarly, table 3 presents C(P). The processor is able to identify perfectly 
the state D1, i.e. 1 1 ( ) 1D DC P  . The processor knows about the other states 
only that it is not D1. The probability that state D2, U1, or U2 is selected 
reflects the frequency specified by the probability distribution regarding the 
actual state. 
 
  
U1 
 
U2 
 
D1 
 
D2 
 
U1 
1
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D  
2
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D  
 
0 
2
1
( )
1 ( )
p D
p D  
 
U2 
1
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D
 2
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D
  
0 
2
1
( )
1 ( )
p D
p D  
D1 0 0 1 0 
 
D2 
1
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D  
2
1
( )
1 ( )
p U
p D  
 
0 
2
1
( )
1 ( )
p D
p D  
Table 3: State probabilities of the processor in the Cooperative 
 
5.4 Bias 
The payoffs of the agents in the four governance structures are determined 
in 5.4.1. The efficient governance structure is identified in 5.4.2. The 
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distinction between type I and type II errors is made in 5.4.3 and we 
compare again the performance of various governance structures. 
 
5.4.1 Payoffs 
Define Bji as the benefit when state j is selected while the actual state is i. 
The loss associated with selecting the wrong state is captured by assuming 
that ji iiB B  when j≠i. So the expected benefit of agent k in governance 
structure Г is
4
1
( ) ( ) ( )k ik
i
E p i B
 
*  *¦ , where 4
1
( ) ( )ik ij ji
j
B k B
 
*  *¦ . ( )ikB *  
represents the expected benefit for player k when state i prevails in 
governance structure Г. The expected benefit of governance structure Г is 
then
2
1
( ) ( )k
k
E E
 
*  *¦ . Table 4 presents the composition of the expected 
benefit of all governance structures. It is assumed for simplicity that Bii=s 
and Bji=-t when j≠i, and s>0, t>0. That is, there is a benefit due to selecting 
the right state and a loss due to selecting the wrong state.  
 
 M C FI BI 
 
Farmer 
1 1 1 1( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
p s p t  
 
s s 1 1
2 2
s t  
 
Processor 
1 1(1 )
2 2
p s pt   2 21 2
1 1
p p p ps t
p p
   
 
1 1
2 2
s t  S 
 
Total 
3 1
2 2
s t  2 22 2
1 1
p p ps t
p p
  
 3 12 2s t
 3 1
2 2
s t  
Table 4: The payoffs of the agents in the four governance structures 
 
The expected benefits of Market, Forward integration and Backward 
integration are always equal, i.e. 3 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
E M E FI E BI s t    . The reason 
is that their partitions are the same when the upstream and downstream 
parties’ partitions are put together, i.e. 
1 2,U U are grouped in one subset, 1 2,D D  
are grouped in one subset, and four subsets each with a state.  The expected 
benefits of Cooperative is
2 22 2( )
1 1
p p pE C s t
p p
    .  
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5.4.2 Efficient governance structure 
Straightforward calculations allow one to ascertain how the efficiency of 
governance structures is influenced by the probabilities of the states. 
Consider the case Bii=s and Bji=-t when j≠i, and s>0, t>0. The four 
governance structures are equally efficient if 1
2
p  , i.e. 
       1 2 1 2 14p U p U p D p D    . That is, governance structure does not matter 
when all states occur with the same probability because the number of 
cognitive units is the same across the four governance structures. The 
agents can make four partitions in every governance structure. The 
difference is how they partition, namely, which states are distinguished and 
which are not. When all the states are equally likely to happen, the only 
thing that matters is the number of partitions and payoffs. All governance 
structures generate the same benefits because have the same number of 
cognitive units, the same benefit of selecting the right state and the same 
loss of selecting the wrong state. Proposition 1 summarizes the result of 
comparison. 
 
Proposition 1: Cooperative is uniquely efficient when 10
2
p  , Bii=s and 
Bji=-t when j≠i. 
 
A small p means the states 1 2,D D  are much more likely to happen as 
compared to 1 2,U U . Because Cooperative is the only governance structure 
with the farmer as well as the processor paying particular attention to 1D , 
the comparative advantage of Cooperative increases with  1p D .  The other 
three governance structures are efficient when 1 1
2
p  , i.e. 1 2,U U  are much 
more likely to happen as compared to 1 2,D D .  
 
Next we examine the case where the benefit due to identifying an upstream 
state differs from that due to selecting the downstream state correctly, i.e. 
1 1 2 2U U U U U
B B s { , 
1 1 2 2D D D D D
B B s { , and Bji=-t when j≠i, and sU >0, sD>0, 
t>0. We obtain 3 3 1( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
2 2 2U D
E M E FI E BI ps p s t      and
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2 2 22 2 2( )
1 1 1U D
p p p p p pE C s s t
p p p
        .  To compare the total payoffs of 
different governance structure, we look at
2(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(2 1)( ) ( )
2( 1) 2( 1) 2( 1)U D
p p p p pE M E C s s t
p p p
          . Proposition 2 
summarizes the implications of this expression.  
 
Proposition 2: Cooperative always generates less upstream payoffs and 
more downstream payoffs as compared to the other three governance 
structures. When 10
2
p  ( 1 1
2
p  ), Cooperative incurs less (more) loss 
than the other three governance structures. 
 
This result can also be explained by the partitions of these governance 
structures. Cooperative has an advantage in distinguishing one of the 
downstream states and a disadvantage in distinguishing the upstream states. 
The expected loss is lower (higher) when the downstream state is more 
(less) likely to prevail. 
 
5.4.3 Type I and type II errors and efficient governance structure 
One interpretation of the above results regarding the efficient governance 
structure is that they entail a comparison of the various governance 
structures in terms of type II errors. The expected benefit of each 
governance structure is determined, given that a project is adopted by both 
agents anyway. This results in a benefit when the right state is selected, but 
it turns into a loss when the wrong state is selected, i.e. a type II error.  
 
Next we consider also the type I errors made by a governance structure. 
This is done by distinguishing two decisions made by each agent: proposal 
selection and project implementation. In the first stage, the agent has to 
decide whether (s)he will accept or reject a proposal, based on his/her 
expected payoff. If the proposal is rejected, the agent takes no further action 
and the expected payoff of the agent is 0. If the proposal is accepted, then 
the project implementation proceeds as specified above and results 
sometimes in a type II error. Sometimes the right decision is taken by not 
choosing a proposal, i.e. the project is not implemented in the wrong state. 
However, not adopting a proposal may also entail that the wrong decision is 
taken. It prevents that a benefit occurs when the right state is selected. This 
is a type I error. In the second stage, the agent has to identify the state or 
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category of the proposal. Each agent in the governance structures has to 
make independent decisions in these two stages whether (s)he will adopt a  
proposal and how (s)he will implement the project. The expected payoff of 
a certain governance structure is the sum of the expected payoff of the two 
agents if they both adopt the proposals. If only one of the two agents adopt 
a proposal, then his/her expected payoff constitutes the expected payoff of 
the governance structure. If neither agent adopts a proposal, the governance 
structure generates zero payoff. 
 
Take Cooperative as an example. The farmer will accept all proposals in 
that his perfect partitions of the states guarantee an expected benefit of s 
and a loss of zero. The processor will only accept a proposal when the 
expected benefit exceeds the expected loss, i.e.
2 24 4
1 1
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1 1P ij jii j
p p p pE C p i P B s t
p p  
   *   ! ¦ ¦ , which is equivalent to 
2
2
1
2
p pt s
p p
   . Similarly it can shown that the farmer in Market accepts a 
proposal when 1
1
pt s
p
  , whereas the processor in Market accepts when 
2 pt s
p
 . The farmer in Forward integration and the processor in 
Backward integration will always accept whereas the processor in Forward 
integration and the farmer in Backward integration accept only if t<s.  
 
Overall, the larger is the loss due to selecting wrong state, the less likely 
each agent is to accept a proposal and undertake the project. The farmer in 
Cooperative and Forward integration and the processor in Backward 
integration have accurate partitions of the states and will always accept the 
proposals. Other agents will only accept a proposal when the expected 
payoffs as specified in table 4 are positive, which means each of them has a 
threshold in terms of the minimum expected benefit or maximum expected 
loss. We consider in the following analysis the threshold to be the 
maximum expected loss at which an agent would accept a proposal. That is, 
an agent will reject a proposal when the expected loss is higher than the 
threshold loss. Denote the threshold value of t for agent k in governance 
structure Г as kT
* . For example, CPT  is determined by
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2 21 2( ) 0
1 1
C
P P
p p p pE C s T
p p
       , i.e. 
2
2
1
2
C
P
p pT s
p p
   . A closer inspection 
of the threshold of the agents leads to proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: When 0 2 3p   , FI BI M C MP F F P PT T T T T    . When
12 3
2
p   , FI BI C M MP F P F PT T T T T    . When 1 12 p  ,
C FI BI M M
P P F P FT T T T T    . 
 
The farmer in Cooperative and Forward integration and the processor in 
Backward integration have the highest thresholds because they do not make 
any omission or commission errors and therefore accept all proposals and 
successfully implement them. Players with low thresholds are those who 
are prone to make type II errors and therefore are stricter in proposal 
screening. Proposition 3 implies that the processor in Cooperative is more 
conservative than other agents in proposal selection when the probability 
associated with the upstream stage is high. (S)he will only accept a proposal 
when the expected benefit (or the expected loss) is high (low) enough as 
compared with other agents. This conservatism is reflected in Cooperatives’ 
innovation strategies. Cooperative members may insist on a high expected 
return in order to undertake a project. For example, they often have a 
decision rule that only projects with an expected return in excess of 20 
percent be undertaken. It is widely recognized that a cooperative enterprise 
usually does not assimilate all the opportunities for profit that come its way, 
but instead sticks to the original products and rarely expand to products that 
have little connection with its life blood (Helmberger 1966). Our result 
confirms the descriptions in LeVay (1983) that cooperative management is 
constrained and conservative, and cooperatives perform poorly in terms of 
growth. It also offer an explanation to Helmberger’s claim that ‘there may 
be markets that are essentially closed to the cooperative firm but open to 
others’ (1966, p143). Cooperative enterprises pursue fewer initiatives and 
are more inert to change than other enterprises. The inertia to adjust to the 
changing market and technology constitutes a serious threat to the 
development of cooperatives. 
 
Next we compare again the performance of the four governance structures 
taking account of the proposal selection stage prior to the project 
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implementation discussed in previous section. When 1 1
2
p  , if CPt T , 
all agents accept all proposals and expected benefits of all governance 
structures are the same as what we had when only the stage of project 
implementation is involved, i.e. 3 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
E M E FI E BI s t    , 
2 22 2( )
1 1
p p pE C s t
p p
    . It immediately follows that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E C E M E FI E BI    given that 1 1
2
p  . The processor in 
Cooperative makes more type II errors than other agents by grouping U2, 
D1 and D2 while distinguishing only U1, which is less likely to happen than 
D1 and D2. If C FI BIP P FT t T T   , the processor in Cooperative will choose 
not to proceed with any proposal. We find
3 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
E C s s t E M E FI E BI      . This is because the processor 
in Cooperative makes too many type I errors by being inert. If
FI BI M
P F PT T t T   , the processor in Forward integration and the farmer in 
Backward integration will also choose to reject all proposals. So
3 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
E M s t s E C E FI E BI      . This is due to the fact that the 
agents in Market makes too many type II errors and the potential loss of 
type II errors is increased compared with the previous cases. If 
M M
P FT t T  , the processor in Market will no longer accept a proposal. It 
follows therefore 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
p pE M s t s E C E FI E BI       . The 
farmer in Market is subject to type II errors and the potential loss of type II 
errors is even larger compared to the previous case. If MFT t , only the 
farmer in Cooperative and Forward integration and the processor in 
Backward integration accept proposals. We obtain therefore
( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( )E M s E C E FI E BI     . The agents in Market do not 
generate any benefit or loss by rejecting all the proposals while the other 
governance structures generate only a benefit and therefore perform better. 
Proposition 4 summarizes these findings.  
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Proposition 4: When 10
2
p  , Cooperative is the efficient governance 
structure. When 1 1
2
p  ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E C E M E FI E BI    if t<s, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E M E C E FI E BI   if t>s.  
 
Figure 2 depicts this result. Proposition 1 claims that a Cooperative is only 
efficient when 10
2
p  , if only type II errors are considered in the 
calculation of benefits. Proposition 4 implies that Cooperative can also be 
efficient when 1 1
2
p  if type I errors are taken into account.  This result 
has an intuitive explanation. According to proposition 3, when 1 1
2
p  , 
the processor in Cooperative is very conservative in proposal selection. t>s 
entails that the potential loss is larger than the potential benefit. The relative 
advantage of Cooperative in rejecting proposals that are not profitable 
becomes increasingly important. Consequently, Cooperative is more likely 
to be efficient in that it now has an option to reject the proposal and avoid 
type II errors. 
 
Figure 2: The efficient governance structure 
 
5.5 Conclusions and further research 
There is a growing awareness that the bounded cognition of people has 
implications for firms and their governance structures. Despite the fact that 
human behavior falls short of the rational ideal in important ways, these 
behaviors can be incorporated into policy design in a way that can improve 
the efficiency of decision making (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). Our model 
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addresses governance structure from a bounded cognition perspective. 
There are two main contributions. First, governance structures differ in 
their allocation of attention. This is captured by each agent in each 
governance structure grouping states in a unique way. This has an impact 
on when and how frequent the wrong state regarding the implementation of 
a project is selected. It captures on the one hand the way governance 
structure channels attention and cognition, and on the other hand distinct 
ownership features of each governance structure. Second, the efficient 
governance structure is determined by the bias of each player in terms of 
type I and type II errors. The influence of the bias on the relative 
performance of the governance structures depends on the probability of the 
various states and the size of the potential benefit and loss. Cooperative is 
efficient when the downstream state is more likely to occur because of its 
specific focus. Cooperative processor is more conservative than other 
agents, which renders it an advantage when the potential loss due to 
selecting the wrong state is large. This may have implications for a 
cooperative enterprise’s diversification (the “make-or-buy” decision) and 
innovation strategies. 
 
There are various possibilities for further research. First, the model 
specifies one farmer and one processor. However, an important aspect of 
cooperatives is that the society of members owns the infrastructure of the 
downstream processor. This raises many issues of collective decision 
making, and it becomes more difficult when there is also member 
heterogeneity. A first start to model these issues is to distinguish at least 
two farmers, where each farmer is characterized by a distinct partition. 
Having two farmers allows for many additional governance structures, like 
an association, homogeneous cooperatives, and heterogeneous cooperatives, 
where each governance structure is expected to channel and shape 
information in a unique way. Second, the above model is silent about the 
role of a CEO in a cooperative. One of the roles of a CEO from an 
information partition perspective is that (s)he serves as a linking pin (Likert 
1961), i.e. an interface connecting the upstream and down stage of 
production in order to realize complementarities. In the language of our 
model, the unique partition of the CEO serves as a cognitive bridge 
between the world (partition) of farmers and the world (partition) of the 
processor. This allows for determining the value of the CEO from a 
cognition perspective. Third, future research may endogenize the number of 
cognitive units in various governance structures. The current model 
105 
 
assumes that the number of cognitive units is fixed across governance 
structures in order to make a fair comparison. Endogenizing the number of 
cognitive units may start to address the efficient incompleteness of 
contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986). 
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Summary 
 
A cooperative is a firm collectively owned by many independent input 
suppliers or buyers. This dissertation examines the nature of a cooperative 
and its efficiency compared with other governance structures from the 
perspectives of motivation, coordination and cognition. First, a multi-task 
principal-agent model is developed to address the motivation issues in 
cooperatives. It captures that a cooperative is not publicly listed and that it 
has to bring the enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. We 
find that the lack of public listing in cooperatives may result in the 
cooperative being the unique efficient governance structure under either 
one of two conditions: 1) additional sources of information like accounting 
information and subjective performance evaluations are available; 2) the 
upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the 
strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream 
marginal product. Second, the impact of governance structure on the choice 
of coordination mechanism in a chain is investigated. The governance 
structures cooperative and IOF are distinguished. A cooperative as a 
coordination device is always efficient due to its prevention of double 
mark-up. Last, the dissertation attempts to gain a better understanding of 
the governance structure choice in a bounded cognition framework. The 
influence of governance structures (market, cooperative, forward 
integration, and backward integration) on the information partitions of 
boundedly rational agents is specified. Our characterization of the 
governance structures captures on the one hand the way they channel 
attention and cognition, and on the other hand the distinct ownership 
distributions. We show that each governance structure can be efficient, 
depending on the probabilities of the various states and the size of the 
potential benefit and loss. A cooperative enterprise’s conservativeness to 
change is explained. 
 
To wrap up, the dissertation aims to deepen the current understanding of the 
cooperative as one governance structure out of many. It is compared with 
other governance structures from various perspectives. In doing so, I hope 
to ease the doubt of some researchers regarding the efficiency of the 
cooperative and to identify the conditions under which cooperatives are 
efficient.  
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l)MOTIVATION, COORDINATION AND COGNITION IN COOPERATIVES
A cooperative is a firm collectively owned by many independent input suppliers or buyers.
This dissertation examines the nature of a cooperative and its efficiency compared with
other governance structures from the perspectives of motivation, coordination and cogni -
tion. We find that the lack of public listing in cooperatives may result in the cooperative being
the unique efficient governance structure under either one of two conditions: 1) addi tio -
nal sources of information like accounting information and subjective performance evalua -
tions are available; 2) the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing
in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal
product. A cooperative as a coordination device is always efficient due to its prevention of
double mark-up. The influence of governance structures (market, cooperative, forward
integration, and backward integration) on the information partitions of boundedly rational
agents is also investigated. We show that each governance structure can be efficient,
depending on the probabilities of the various states and the size of the potential benefit
and loss. A cooperative enterprise’s conservativeness to change is explained.
In sum, the main objective of the dissertation is to deepen the current understanding
of the cooperative as one governance structure out of many. It is compared with other
governance structures from various perspectives. In doing so, I hope to ease the doubt of
some researchers regarding the efficiency of the cooperative and to identify the conditions
under which cooperatives are efficient. 
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